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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to determine the cause of the different economic outcomes in 
Ecuador and Bolivia after the drop in hydrocarbon prices in 2014. Why was Bolivia, 
under the administration of Evo Morales, seemingly able to escape the resource curse in 
recent years, while under Correa, Ecuador’s economy collapsed when confronted with a 
bust in commodity prices? Using five characteristics of the resource curse from existing 
literature, this thesis examines the policies of Correa and Morales to determine whether 
the leaders avoided the pitfalls of resource wealth while attempting to achieve sustained 
socioeconomic growth in their respective countries. This thesis hypothesizes that the 
Correa administration’s heavy use of Chinese loans exacerbated the resource curse in 
Ecuador, while the Morales administration executed conservative macroeconomic 
policies to partially mitigate the resource curse in Bolivia. 
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1 
I. CHINESE LOANS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE IN 
ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The hard turn to the left and rejection of neoliberal policies in Ecuador and Bolivia 
seemed almost identical for ten years while two democratically elected strongmen held 
power. Between former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa (2007–2017) and former 
Bolivian president Evo Morales (2006–2019), the pair won six elections and slashed 
poverty and inequality figures in their respective countries. The two polarizing leaders won 
elections by rejecting the neoliberal model, promising to nationalize the hydrocarbon 
industry, and converting to a state capitalist model. A central goal of these governments 
was to defeat the infamous resource curse—by which resource-rich countries 
paradoxically struggle to take advantage of their natural wealth and instead face 
socioeconomic and political troubles—that had plagued their nations for decades. Both 
Ecuador and Bolivia are considered “resource rich” by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) because they derive “at least 20 percent of exports or 20 percent of fiscal revenue 
from nonrenewable natural resources.”1 Many theorists claim this natural wealth is actually 
a curse, especially when states possess natural hydrocarbon wealth.2 The economies of 
Ecuador and Bolivia rode the wave of the commodities boom during the initial stages of 
Correa and Morales’s presidencies. Yet, despite the significant similarities in Ecuador and 
Bolivia’s recent experiences and their leaders’ shared goals, following the crash of 
hydrocarbon prices in 2014, the two economies have sharply diverged. Ecuador suffered a 
sharp decline in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita from 2014 to 2018, losing .32% 
 
1 Anthony J. Venables, “Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So 
Difficult?,” OxCarre Research Paper (Oxford, United Kingdom: University of Oxford, 2016), 3. 
2 See “The Dutch Disease,” The Economist, November 26, 1977, ProQuest Central; Terry Lynn Karl, 
“The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” Journal of International Affairs 53, 
no. 1 (1999): 31–48; Venables, “Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So 
Difficult?”; Michael L. Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 18, no. 1 (2015): 239–59, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359. 
2 
overall.3 Meanwhile, Bolivia enjoyed slowed but steady growth during the same period, 
gaining 4.67% GDP per capita overall, and did not experience a year of GDP per capita 
decline. Consequently, Bolivia’s socioeconomic gains should continue while Ecuador’s 
improvements in poverty and inequality could be reversed without a significant jump in oil 
prices.4 What accounts for the drastic difference in economic outcomes between these two 
Latin American nations in recent years? Why was Bolivia, under the administration of Evo 
Morales, seemingly able to escape the resource curse in recent years while under Correa, 
Ecuador’s economy collapsed when confronted with a bust in commodity prices?  
This thesis examines the role of international loan and trade frameworks, and in 
particular Chinese loan programs, in ameliorating or exacerbating the resource curse. Latin 
American developing economies have relied heavily on international loans in the past, but 
Chinese loans are changing the rules of the game. Existing literature theorizes that 
international borrowing can perpetuate the resource curse if macroeconomic policies are 
flawed; however, the current literature does not focus on the source and characteristics of 
the loans themselves.5  
In the context of Latin America, the thesis argues that the Chinese loan programs 
that countries across the region relied on to implement major development initiatives 
during the boom period had similar characteristics to natural resource revenue. In 
Ecuador’s case, the government borrowed heavily from China. These loans exacerbated 
the resource curse by creating dependency and vulnerability. Bolivia, on the other hand, 
mitigated the resource curse by decentralizing its government, limiting its reliance on loan 
programs, and amassing significant foreign reserves to withstand the hydrocarbon bust. In 
short, the difference between the traditionally resource cursed Andean nations after 2014 
is a result of Ecuador’s borrowing and Bolivia’s savings.  
 
3 “World Development Indicators DataBank,” June 10, 2019, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/
reports.aspx?source=2&country=VEN#. Author’s elaboration from World bank data.  
4 Iván Gachet et al., “Vertical and Horizontal Inequality in Ecuador: The Lack of Sustainability,” 
WIDER Working Paper (United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research: Helsinki, 
Finland, 2016), 1–2. 
5 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” 1999, 36. 
3 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the choices resource-rich governments make during boom-
and-bust commodity cycles, and the economic and political outcomes those choices lead 
to. The research question—why are Ecuador and Bolivia experiencing different economic 
outcomes despite comparable political projects?—can be broken into two sub-questions 
specific to each country. Do Chinese loans exacerbate the resource curse in Ecuador by 
causing heightened dependency and vulnerability? Also, did Bolivia’s decentralization and 
use of foreign reserves mitigate the resource curse? These two questions are important to 
many resource-rich states currently going through economic and social development and 
trying to avoid a resource curse. Additionally, both states democratically elected their 
leaders, but are considered unconsolidated democracies or semidemocracies.6 This study 
examines the connection between the resource curse and authoritarian tendencies. This 
thesis is also significant to the study of state capitalism, as it studies potential missteps and 
successes of the model in Latin America.  
Ecuador’s issues are significant because many countries throughout Latin America 
and the world are borrowing from China. Many of Ecuador’s loans with China are loan-
for-oil deals, and China is using this model with several resource-rich developing states 
throughout the world.7 Additionally, Chinese loan structures are distinct from capital 
investments or International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans in that they typically have a 
longer time horizon.8 Therefore, this study examines what effect this loan structure has on 
borrowing nations.  
Although Bolivia experienced political turmoil with the ousting of Morales after a 
disputed election in 2019, the country is economically stable for the time being. If their 
strong growth during the commodity boom and stability during the bust was a result of 
 
6 Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Cross-Currents in Latin America,” Journal of 
Democracy 26, no. 1 (2015): 123, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0003. 
7 Eugene Gholz, Umul Awan, and Ehud Ronn, “Financial and Energy Security Analysis of China’s 
Loan-for-Oil Deals,” Energy Research & Social Science 24 (2017): 45, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.erss.2016.12.021. 
8 Stephen Kaplan, “The Rise of Patient Capital: The Political Economy of Chinese Global Finance,” 
IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, 2018. 
4 
state policies, then Bolivia’s model should be examined in depth. This thesis aims to 
determine if the actions of the Bolivian state were responsible for the triumph over the 
resource curse and what other states in similar conditions can do to replicate the success.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To determine the difference between the outcomes of the two resource-rich 
countries of Ecuador and Bolivia, the literature review will first examine the basic concepts 
of the resource curse. The discussion will then branch to differing opinions on the cause of 
the slow growth. Finally, the study will examine how those countries attempt to mitigate 
the side effects of natural resource wealth.     
1. The Resource Curse 
Resource curse literature attempts to explain the political, social, and economic 
problems that resource-rich countries paradoxically face. “Ten years from now, 20 years 
from now, you will see, oil will bring us ruin…We are drowning in the devil’s 
excrement.”9 This prediction in the 1970s from former Venezuelan Oil Minister and OPEC 
co-founder Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo was more than a premonition; it became a reality in 
many countries. The Economist coined the term “Dutch Disease” in 1977 to describe some 
of the problems oil-producing countries experienced after oil discovery—in particular, an 
overly strong currency, high amounts of government spending, and unwise investing.10 
Author Terry Lynn Karl describes the oil curse as the “paradox of plenty,” saying that oil 
wealth runs havoc on a state’s institutions, especially states that are undergoing “modern 
state-building.”11 Michael Ross summarizes one branch of resource curse literature as 
examining “the relationship between resource wealth and the quality of institutions, 
meaning the effectiveness of the government bureaucracy, the incidence of corruption, the 
rule of law, and more broadly, the state’s capacity to promote economic development.”12 
 
9 Jerry Useem, “The Devil’s Excrement,” Fortune Magazine, February 3, 2003, 
https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/02/03/336434/index.htm. 
10 “The Dutch Disease,” 82. 
11 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” 34, 35. 
12 Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” 248. 
5 
Authors disagree on the origin of the resource curse due to the variance in outcomes 
of countries like Ecuador and Bolivia. The mainstream view comes from authors Sachs 
and Warner. The authors find that low growth occurs in countries with a “high ratio of 
natural resource exports to GDP.”13 This leading theory claims that variance between 
resource rich-countries comes from a difference in their abundance of resource wealth. 
However, authors Brunnschweiler and Bulte dispute this finding and the use of the term 
“abundance.”14 The authors argue that the consensus view is actually describing 
dependency in a resource rather than abundance, and that the word “dependency” indicates 
that the causality should be reversed.15 Brunnschweiler and Bulte claim that weak 
institutions become dependent on natural resources, not the opposite. Another set of 
authors also disagree that abundance has a negative relationship with growth and find that 
the volatility in the price of commodities is to blame.16 They determine that the boom-and- 
bust of primary products and the resulting variance on resource rents is what negatively 
affects growth. Therefore, countries that have diversified economies can avoid what the 
authors call the volatility curse.17  
A growing body of literature now focuses on the policies that politicians put in 
place to maximize resource rents. Ecuador and Bolivia drastically changed policies after 
Correa and Morales entered their respective offices, and the decisions of each could be 
important to the difference in outcomes. Author Erling Røed Larsen stresses that protecting 
the manufacturing industry is vital to prevent the onset of the Dutch Disease, claiming 
Norway outpaced its neighbors by shielding the economy from laissez-faire behavior using 
 
13 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth 
(Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, December1995), 2. 
14 Christa Brunnschweiler and Erwin Bulte, “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of 
Paradoxes and Red Herrings,” IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, 2006, 3. 
15 Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 3. 
16 Tiago V. de V. Cavalcanti, Commodity Price Volatility and the Sources of Growth, IMF Working 
Paper ; WP/12/12 (Washington, District of Columbia: International Monetary Fund, 2012); W Leong and K 
Mohaddes, “Institutions and the Volatility Curse,” IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc, 2011. 
17 Cavalcanti, Commodity Price Volatility and the Sources of Growth, 15; Leong and Mohaddes, 
“Institutions and the Volatility Curse,” 1. 
6 
a “centralized wage negotiation system and income coordination.”18 Larsen’s argument 
centers on strong governmental technocratic expertise and a healthy judicial system to 
protect against unlawful enrichment. The success of countries like Norway influenced a 
mainstream view that proclaims strong institutions with transparency and accountability 
are the way to defeat the resource curse.19 Other authors find this view unrealistic. Not 
many developing nations can count on strong institutions; therefore, are they destined to 
suffer from the resource curse? Another approach claims “pockets of effectiveness” within 
the bureaucracy of a resource-rich state can make the difference.20 An effective 
bureaucratic pocket within the energy sector will work for the long-term national interests 
of a resource-rich nation, making cautious deals with international oil companies (IOC) 
while avoiding clientelism and economic populism.21 Author Todd Moss believes the 
answer to the resource curse is to take the government mostly out of the distribution process 
of resource rent.22Instead of numerous social programs, Moss recommends that the 
resource rents of nationalized industries go directly to citizens in the form of dividends. 
The process would be more transparent as governments would be held accountable to their 
citizens, and governments would be able to register citizens for taxation, the ultimate goal 
of an effective state.23Additionally, saving techniques such as sovereign wealth funds and 
high levels of foreign reserves are common recommendations to protect against the 
volatility of natural resource markets. 
In summary, opinions vary greatly on the matter of ameliorating the resource curse. 
Authors give many solutions, including strengthening institutions, becoming more 
 
18 Erling Røed Larsen, Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? : When and Why 
Norway Caught up with and Forged Ahead of Its Neighbors (Statistics Norway, Research Department, 
2004), 7. 
19 Giles Mohan, “The Politics of Governing Oil Effectively: A Comparative Study of Two New Oil-
Rich States in Africa,” Brooks World Poverty Institute Working Paper Series, 2014–74 (2015): 7. 
20 Mohan, 3. 
21 Mohan, 5–11. 
22 “Turning Oil into Cash: How Developing Countries Can Win the Resource Lottery and Avoid the 
Curse,” Center For Global Development, June 3, 2015, https://www.cgdev.org/article/turning-oil-cash-
how-developing-countries-can-win-resource-lottery-and-avoid-curse. 
23 “Turning Oil into Cash.” 
7 
transparent, or shrinking government social spending and distributing funds directly to 
citizens. However, when comparing Ecuador and Bolivia, the two countries have 
comparable characteristics along many of these dimensions, and none of these approaches 
consider the role that lending plays in shaping the effects of the resource curse.   
2. Chinese Loans    
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries borrowed over $141 billion from 
Chinese policy banks from 2005 to 2018, with approximately 93% of the money going to 
just four countries: Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador.24 The top four countries 
receiving loans from China have massive potential in their energy sectors and nationalized 
oil and gas markets. Debate surrounding the loans usually focuses on the influence that 
China could potentially buy with these loans, but there is a gap in the literature about how 
the injection of capital specifically impacts Latin American economies. Chinese loans and 
Latin American resources are intimately connected; therefore Chinese loans could 
potentially interact with characteristics of the resource curse.    
High external debt is a trademark of the resource curse, but the arrival of Chinese 
financing to developing states is often seen as a solution to overcoming lean profit years 
from commodities. Chinese loans are not typical of the financing that resource-rich nations 
have seen in the past. According to author Stephen Kaplan, Chinese loans are a form of 
patient capital for Latin American countries.25 Kaplan asserts that Chinese loans give 
debtor governments more autonomy and flexibility than the “conditionality-linked Western 
financing.” He describes the loans as patient because they support the state-capitalist 
model, whereas capital for privatized assets is vulnerable to capital flight from lenders that 
attempt to maximize short-term gains.26 Kaplan provides statistical evidence indicating 
that governments receiving money from China are more likely to run a budgetary deficit, 
 
24 Kevin P. Gallagher and Margaret Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” Inter-American 
Dialogue, June 10, 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/; “Congressional Testimony: Dollar 
Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining China’s Role in the Western Hemisphere,” The Dialogue, accessed 
May 17, 2019, https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/congressional-testimony-dollar-diplomacy-or-debt-
trap-examining-chinas-role-in-the-western-hemisphere/. 
25 Kaplan, “The Rise of Patient Capital: The Political Economy of Chinese Global Finance,” 1–30. 
26 Kaplan, 3. 
8 
allowing for more policy freedom. Overall, Kaplan is optimistic about the potential 
flexibility that Chinese loans could provide developing Latin American countries.    
Interestingly, the type of administration that is most likely to take advantage of the 
enhanced budgetary discretion provided by China is the extreme left, or populist left.27 
Although Chinese loans give governments like Ecuador greater fiscal freedom, Kaplan also 
warns that “by lending without policy conditions, China may be encouraging developing 
country governments to spend without bounds, sowing the seeds for future debt 
problems.”28 Therefore, fiscally responsible governments can benefit from the patient 
option of Chinese financing, but Chinese loans also encourage irresponsible spending. 
Harold Trinkunas agrees with Kaplan’s caveat, and the author finds that direct Chinese 
leverage on Latin American countries’ domestic policies is limited, but Chinese loans 
enable governments “to pursue their preferred policies more aggressively.”29 Although 
Trinkunas finds that “countries with weak governance indicators” are negatively affected 
by the loans, the relationship is indirect. Consequently, Latin American governments’ 
decisions, rather than Chinese pressure, are directly responsible for an erosion of 
“democracy, human rights, labor, and environmental gains.”30 Therefore, Chinese loans 
alter political and economic outcomes by intensifying the impact of policy choices due to 
the large amounts of capital they inject into some countries and not others. Governments 
that make fiscally responsible choices can accelerate growth, whereas governments that 
suffer from ineffective or authoritarian leadership can amplify their problems.  
Overall, Kaplan focuses on the potential positives of patient capital while Trinkunas 
mainly concentrates on whether China is buying influence. They acknowledge that the 
loans have the potential to amplify poor policy decisions, but the authors do not discuss 
how Chinese loans interact with the most significant part of many Latin American 
 
27 Kaplan, 4. 
28 Kaplan, 1. 
29 Harold Trinkunas, “Renminbi Diplomacy? The Limits of China’s Influence on Latin America’s 
Domestic Politics,” Order from Chaos: Geoeconomics and Global Issues (Foreign Policy at Brookings, 
November 2016), 3. 
30 Trinkunas, 3. 
9 
economies—the extraction, production, and exportation of natural resources. This thesis 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature and to connect Chinese loans and their effect on 
the resource curse. 
3. The Impact of Chinese Loans on the Resource Curse  
This thesis identifies five specific characteristics of the resource curse from the 
literature: ineffective institutions, authoritarian tendencies, dependence on resource wealth 
and negative trade balances, high government spending, and misguided public works—and 
considers the extent to which Chinese loans may exacerbate resource curse dynamics along 
each of these areas. First, the resource curse characteristic will be explained, and then the 
potential connection to Chinese loans will be examined.    
a. Characteristic 1: Ineffective Institutions 
A state that suffers from the resource curse will often experience centralized 
decision-making. Therefore, scholars claim that politicians are able to undermine state 
institutions, and perceived corruption is more likely. Karl contends that rulers of resource- 
rich states “have no immediate incentives” to be frugal or decentralize their power, and 
therefore become overcentralized in order to “give foreign capital a bargaining partner.”31 
Over time, hydrocarbon contracts have transitioned from IOC domination to greater 
ownership by individual states in the form of national oil companies (NOC). This transition 
gives more natural resource ownership to the central government, and when the institutions 
of the government are weak, states typically fall prey to corruption and squander their 
resources in unproductive activities.32 Corruption in particular can discourage traditional 
investors that might bolster a country’s extraction industry. 
The terms and conditions of Chinese loans lack transparency and conditionality, 
and China prefers to negotiate government-to-government.33 Multilateral organizations, 
 
31 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” 1999, 37. 
32 Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik, “Institutions and the Resource Curse*,” 
Economic Journal 116, no. 508 (2006): 3, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01045.x. 
33 “Congressional Testimony.” 
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such as the IMF, grant loans based on the condition that a government is not corrupt and 
practices good governance.34 Due to these differences from typical loans, Chinese loans 
could exacerbate corruption and hurt government effectiveness in Ecuador.  
b. Characteristic 2: Authoritarian Tendencies      
A high majority of resource-rich nations are authoritarian. Ross demonstrates that 
“the greater a country’s oil income, the less likely it has been to transit to democracy.”35 
In particular, Ross claims that authoritarians with extra cash from resources are able to buy 
off citizens, cover up the state’s finances, and invest in the loyalty of their military.36 
However, Thad Dunning claims that democracy in Latin America is an exception to the 
rule due to the inequality of the region.37 Dunning asserts that Latin American states are 
more likely to democratize than other resource-rich regions because “resource rents 
mitigate the negative impact of inequality” and incentivize elites to maintain the status quo. 
Rent revenues also reduce the probability that elites will be heavily taxed.38 However, 
many Latin American states remain unconsolidated because of competing resource-related 
authoritarian tendencies.39 Authors Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo contest the 
legitimacy of the resource curse over the long run, but they do agree that authoritarian 
leaders can prolong their rule with resource rents.40 
There is a disagreement between authors concerning the role that aid—or loans for 
that matter—play in democratization. One side of the argument claims that authoritarian 
leaders can use the nontax revenue to hinder their competition and buy time in office, 
 
34 “IMF and Good Governance,” March 3, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/The-IMF-
and-Good-Governance. 
35 Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” 243. 
36 Michael L. Ross, “Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Democracy and the Resource Curse,” Foreign 
Affairs 90, no. 5 (October 2011): 3–4. 
37 Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes., Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics, 2008, 4, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510052. 
38 Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” 246. 
39 Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes., 22. 
40 Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal 
of the Resource Curse,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 1 (2011): 25, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0003055410000584. 
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sustaining their regimes.41 Sarah Bermeo contests that foreign assistance is more 
nuanced.42 Bermeo suggests that donors “are a driving force in determining” the 
relationship between democratization and aid, and claims that on average, aid from 
democratic nations has not caused a decrease in democratization. However, the 
authoritarian Chinese government has displayed apathy concerning the policies of recipient 
nations, and Beijing is not accountable to its own population in comparison to democratic 
lenders. Therefore, Chinese loans may in fact act exceptionally similar to resource rents by 
giving additional funds—with less accountability attached—to leaders with authoritarian 
tendencies in unconsolidated democracies. Leaders could use these funds to oppress 
political opponents while consolidating power and prolonging their time in office. 
Although Ecuador and Bolivia hold democratic elections, both nations have experienced 
democratic erosions under Correa and Morales.43 However, the additional nontax revenue 
from China could have given Correa more independence than his Bolivian counterpart to 
oppress political opponents and halt democratization in Ecuador.             
c. Characteristic 3: Dependence on Resource Wealth and a Negative Trade 
Balance 
States that are resource-rich typically reinvest into the energy sector and neglect 
other domestic industries. Karl reveals that industries such as manufacturing suffer while 
the government continually invests in expensive infrastructure for the energy industry.44 
Additionally, governments rely on nontax revenue from extraction and consequently avoid 
accountability from citizens.45 On the other hand, there are potential benefits to policies of 
extractivism, “such as stabilizing rates of growth, increasing direct foreign investment, 
 
41See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “A Political Economy of Aid,” International 
Organization 63, no. 2 (2009): 309–40, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090109; Kevin Morrison, 
“Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A Best-Case Scenario,” Public Choice 131, no. 3 (2007): 
365–86, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9121-1. 
42 Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, “Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-
Democratization Relationship” 70, no. 1 (2016): 29, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000296. 
43 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, “Cross-Currents in Latin America,” 116. 
44 Karl, Terry Lynn, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” 1999, 34. 
45 Ross, “What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?,” 246. 
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expanding the middle classes and reducing poverty.”46 States that promote extraction build 
confidence for foreign investment; however, investments can lead to overconfidence and 
capital flight. Overconfidence in a country’s resource industry can increase the value of the 
country’s currency. Consequently, an increase in currency value means more expensive—
and therefore less competitive— exports. The result is a negative trade balance, especially 
when combined with a stagnant manufacturing industry that is unable to competitively add 
value to exports.47  
Loans can exacerbate dependence on resource wealth and produce negative trade 
balances because financing is generally tied to the extraction, processing, and 
transportation of the resource. The lender is investing in the future production of the 
resource, but typically stops short of assisting in value-added manufacturing. China is the 
world’s leader in manufacturing, and the Chinese government would achieve higher gains 
by investing in the output of raw materials and adding value on Chinese soil.48     
China invests heavily in energy projects and the infrastructure that will funnel 
resources to its enormous population. Therefore, Chinese financing could push further 
dependency on energy in Ecuador. The loans could also increase Ecuador’s dependency 
on China instead of taxation. Chinese loans take the place of taxation, reducing 
accountability from Ecuadorian citizens. Furthermore, many Chinese loans lack the 
conditionality of multilateral loans, and therefore Ecuador’s government is not accountable 
to accepted macroeconomic spending practices. Bolivia’s reliance on savings potentially 
slows its investment back into the energy sector. To invest heavily in the energy sector, 
Bolivia would have to rely on raised taxes and increased rent from production. Following 
 
46 Hans-Jürgen Burchardt and Kristina Dietz, “(Neo-)Extractivism - a New Challenge for 
Development Theory from Latin America,” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2014): 469, https://doi.org/
10.1080/01436597.2014.893488. 
47 Larsen, Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? : When and Why Norway Caught up 
with and Forged Ahead of Its Neighbors, 5. Dependence on resource wealth and a negative trade balance 
are two symptoms of the Dutch Disease, which is often treated as a separate concept from the resource 
curse. However, this thesis combines the concepts because both phenomena result from resource riches. 
48 Darrell M. West and Christian Lansang, “Global Manufacturing Scorecard: How the U.S. 
Compares to 18 Other Nations,” Brookings (blog), July 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
global-manufacturing-scorecard-how-the-us-compares-to-18-other-nations/. 
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this logic, Ecuador should show signs of exacerbating its dependency on resource wealth 
in comparison to a normal trajectory in Bolivia.  
d. Characteristic 4: High Government Spending 
States with the resource curse suffer from a tendency to overspend. Spending 
money on social programs can help populist leaders stay in power. Leaders use patronage 
and social reforms to appease citizens or be reelected.49 Government bureaucracy becomes 
bloated and government spending rises with the price of commodities. Additionally, states 
neglect savings measures such as sovereign wealth funds or foreign reserves. Finally, the 
population becomes accustomed to a higher standard of living and austerity measures 
become unacceptable politically.    
However, Chinese loans, just like natural resources, are extinguishable. In fact, 
Chinese loans to Latin America have already begun diminishing.50 Leaders of resource-
rich nations do not have incentives to be frugal with their social budget during commodity 
booms. Consequently, a leader that accepts a Chinese loan can continue with an elevated 
budget even when the resource market hits a recession. Overall, the expectation is that 
Ecuador spent more money on social programs because it relied on Chinese loans to pad 
the country’s social spending.  
e. Characteristic 5: Misguided Public Works    
Governments experiencing the resource curse invest hastily, often in white elephant 
projects. Karl contends that the newfound wealth influences leaders of developing nations 
to avoid savings or austerity measures and fund major development projects at home and 
 
49 Burchardt and Dietz, “(Neo-)Extractivism - a New Challenge for Development Theory from Latin 
America,” 477. 
50 Margaret Myers, “The Reasons for China’s Cooling Interest in Latin America,” May 4, 2019, 
https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-beijing-sees-it. 
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abroad.51 Politicians invest in projects that have political appeal but do not necessarily 
entail economic promise for their country.52 
Foreign investment can provide surplus cash for large infrastructure projects or 
even a leader’s pet projects. Borrowed funds are exchanged for future resource rents. 
Consequently, loans allow resource-rich governments to undertake projects that are not 
immediately attainable to resource poor countries. This could mean faster development for 
resource-rich countries if projects are chosen carefully, or irresponsible spending if 
discernment is not employed. Multilateral organizations such as the IMF are more 
restrictive than Chinese loans concerning their spending criteria. Unlike Chinese 
development banks, “the IMF does not lend for specific projects.”53  
Chinese loans may not have the conditionality of multilateral loans as discussed by 
Kaplan, but many loans do come with the condition that accepting countries hire Chinese 
firms and use Chinese labor. Therefore, countries that undertake large-scale projects with 
Chinese development banks and construction firms lose out on some of the positive 
externalities of the projects, such as increased employment in local communities. The 
expectation is that Ecuador used Chinese loans to amplify the size and amount of projects 
that a similar country—like Bolivia—would have undertaken. Furthermore, it is expected 
that Ecuador experienced more bottlenecked or failed projects because Chinese loans— 
and resource rents—are erratic.  
In summary, two countries that have traditionally suffered from the resource curse 
may have different political and economic outcomes if one government chooses to take out 
loans while the other is more cautious with Chinese financing. It is expected that both 
countries continue to experience the resource curse. However, Ecuador’s curse may be 
exacerbated because of the characteristics that Chinese loans share with resource rents.     
 
51 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty,” 1999, 35. 
52 Ragnar Torvik, “Why Do Some Resource-Abundant Countries Succeed While Others Do Not?,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25, no. 2 (2009): 253. 
53 “IMF Lending,” IMF, accessed April 25, 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-
Lending. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis hypothesizes that Chinese loans exacerbate the resource curse by 
generating the incentives for loan-receiving countries to overfocus on the development of 
their natural resources. Specifically, the thesis hypothesizes that countries that receive 
Chinese loans should experience the heightening of the resource curse along the following 
dimensions:  
(1) Ineffective Institutions  
Due to a lack of transparency with Chinese lending, Chinese loans from 
development banks will be associated with a higher degree of centralized decision-making 
and corruption. 
(2) Authoritarian Tendencies  
Chinese loans will act similar to resource rents by reducing overall accountability 
for authoritarian leaders and allowing these leaders to hinder democratization by stifling 
the opposition.  
(3) Dependence on Resource Wealth and a Negative Trade Balance  
Chinese loans will increase an economy’s investments in resource extraction, 
further neglecting value-added manufacturing practices. Additionally, the loans will 
increase the unbalanced trading relationship with China. 
(4) High Government Spending 
The option of Chinese lending further reduces incentives to save and will be 
associated with higher spending. 
(5) Misguided Public Works  
Chinese loans will produce more white elephant projects and more project failure. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Case Selection 
This thesis will consist of two case studies of both Ecuador and Bolivia and how 
each government’s choices affected the resource curse. Ecuador and Bolivia were in 
relatively similar circumstances at the beginning of the presidencies of Correa and Morales. 
Both states were—and continue to be—considered “resource-rich” by the IMF.54 Ecuador 
and Bolivia’s primary resources are hydrocarbons. Ecuador’s main export is petroleum 
while Bolivia specializes in natural gas, and overall hydrocarbons account for more than 
half of each country’s exports.55 Both countries had previously suffered from symptoms 
of the resource curse, and both leaders were able to reset their natural resource industries 
to a certain extent through nationalization and debt reduction. Furthermore, Correa and 
Morales were both considered populist leaders from Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos 
de Nuestra América (ALBA) states, and each leader rode the wave of the commodity boom 
until the crash of oil prices in 2014. Therefore, comparing the starting point and the choices 
of both governments helps to answer the research question.  
To understand the difference between the two Andean states, their economic and 
political performance will be studied to determine if Chinese loans exacerbated the 
resource curse in Ecuador, and if Bolivia mitigated the curse’s effects with 
decentralization, cautious borrowing, and increased savings. Each selected resource curse 
characteristic will be discussed separately.  
Starting with characteristic 1—institutional weakness—the quality of each state’s 
institutions will be surveyed. In each case study, the countries will be analyzed to determine 
if large economic decisions are centralized to a few leaders. Additionally, measures of 
corruption will be observed over time and to indicate the quality of institutions. In the 
individual case studies, corruption will be measured with the executive corruption index 
and regime corruption data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) website. The data 
 
54 Venables, “Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?,” 3. 
55 “Bolivia,” Independent Statistics and Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, July 2015). “Ecuador,” Independent Statistics and Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, October 5, 2017). 
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will be discussed in addition to narratives of corruption due to resource rents and Chinese 
loans.  
To appraise characteristic 2—authoritarian tendencies—in each country, the 
narrative will focus on the authoritarian incentives provided by resource rents and Chinese 
loans. To determine the impact the Chinese loans had on the countries’ respective 
democracies, the case studies will track the dispersion of the loans and savings alongside 
elections and examine how the loan money and resource rents were invested. The V-Dem 
liberal democracy index will also be examined for each country.    
For characteristic 3, dependence on resource wealth and negative trade balances 
will be considered by tracking the spending of the loans on the energy sector, observing 
taxation data in both countries, examining petroleum and natural gas production numbers 
during the Correa and Morales administrations, and assessing the trade balances of Ecuador 
and Bolivia.  
To evaluate characteristic 4—high government spending—in Ecuador and Bolivia, 
the social spending of each country will be measured and discussed. Additionally, the 
savings of the two Andean states will be examined using gross domestic savings and 
foreign reserves as a percentage of debt. Both expenses and savings will be placed in the 
context of the volatility of the hydrocarbon market and Chinese lending.   
Finally, to determine whether a public work is misguided for characteristic 5, key 
government projects will be assessed to determine their efficacy for the local population. 
The narrative will highlight the funding and progress of each project in comparison to 
expectations. This section will also identify projects that failed or are currently 
bottlenecked, which would indicate wasted investments.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will consist of two case studies. Chapter II will concentrate on the 
Ecuadorian government’s choice to borrow money from China. After providing an 
overview of the lending relationship and history between China and Ecuador, the chapter 
will consider how Chinese loans have interacted with the resource curse along each of the 
18 
characteristics identified. Chapter III will present a case study of the Bolivian case, 
focusing on evaluating how the absence of Chinese loans, coupled with a strategic increase 
in foreign reserves, affected the resource curse along each of the characteristics. The 
conclusion of the thesis will compare and contrast the two countries’ actions and the impact 
for developing countries in Latin America and the rest of the world.  
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II. HOW CHINESE LOANS EXACERBATED THE RESOURCE 
CURSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2019, Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno announced the end of fuel 
subsidies as part of a series of austerity measures enacted to receive an IMF loan. The 
Ecuadorian government negotiated the loan to ameliorate a large budget deficit created by 
former President Rafael Correa, who had partially funded populist economic policies with 
more than $19.3 billion in loans from China.56 Moreno’s announcement sparked severe 
public backlash, as protests ensued throughout the country and President Moreno was 
forced to move the government out of the capital city of Quito.57 Moreno and his 
administration eventually rolled back the austerity measures after holding talks with local 
unions and indigenous communities, but Ecuador’s financial dilemma remains unsolved. 
Superficially, the political unrest was due to unwelcome austerity measures, but the source 
of these financial problems is deeper and may be a result of the loans from Chinese 
development banks. This is significant because variants of the loan-for-oil model are 
typical in China’s approach to energy rich-countries. As China continues its “Go Out” 
policy and targets resource-rich states, how will Chinese interests affect these countries? 
This chapter is a case study of Ecuador’s difficulties with the resource curse, and the impact 
Chinese loans have on this phenomenon. Overall, this chapter posits that Chinese loans 
have exacerbated the resource curse in Ecuador by creating dependency and vulnerabilities.  
 
56 Gallagher and Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” June 10, 2019; Paulina Garzón 
and Diana Castro, “China-Ecuador Relations and the Development of the Hydro Sector,” in Building 
Development for a New Era: China’s Infrastructure Projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. 
Enrique Dussel Peters, Ariel C. Armony, and Shoujun Cui (Asian Studies Center, Center for International 
Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, 2018), 28–
29. See note 26 for explanation.  
57 León Cabrera, José María, “Ecuador’s President Moves Seat of Government to Escape Protests,” 
New York Times, October 8, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/world/americas/ecuador-protests-
president.html. 
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B. THE RESOURCE CURSE BEFORE CHINESE LOANS 
The effects of the resource curse in Ecuador predate the issue of Chinese loans and 
the administration of Rafael Correa. Oil was first discovered in 1878 in Ecuador, but the 
first significant discovery occurred in 1967 when Texaco found a vast supply in northern 
Ecuador.58 Soon after, oil comprised over 50% of Ecuador’s exports and increased total 
export revenue from $195 million in 1971 to $1.4 billion in 1977.59 Ecuador continued to 
concentrate on its oil industry, and several characteristics of the resource curse started to 
appear. As revenue climbed, taxes actually decreased while government spending 
increased with the help of foreign loans.60 Ecuador relied heavily on private loans during 
the 1970s and 1980s, but the government defaulted in 1987 when oil prices collapsed.61 
Ecuador later converted these same loans to bonds in 1994, but again defaulted on the 
bonds in 1999 when the economy collapsed. Finally, in 2000, the bonds were again 
restructured and Ecuador abandoned the Ecuadorian sucre in favor of the American dollar 
to help control inflation.62 
Rafael Correa entered office in January 2007 after campaigning on a platform of 
state capitalism, which was a popular response to high oil prices and unfavorable oil 
contracts made in the 1990s.63 Correa reinforced his stance against neoliberalism in 2008 
by declaring Ecuador would not pay the previously restructured $3.2 billion in loans, and 
by claiming bondholders were the “real monsters.”64 However, Ecuador supposedly had 
the capacity to service the loans. An unnamed Ecuadorian financial representative claimed 
“from a financial point of view, there was no reason to default. This was only done to 
 
58 Kathleen Gould, “Oil in Ecuador: The Traps of Transnational Capitalism,” n.d., 11–12. 
59 Gould, 12. 
60 Gould, 13. 
61 Jonas B. Bunte, Raise the Debt: How Developing Countries Choose Their Creditors (Oxford 
University Press, 2019), 100. 
62 Bunte, 101. 
63 Antulio Rosales “Structural Constraints in Times of Resource Nationalism: Oil Policy and State 
Capacity in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador,” Globalizations 17, no. 1 (2020): 78, https://doi.org/10.1080/
14747731.2019.1614722. 
64 Naomi Mapstone, “Ecuador Defaults on Sovereign Bonds,” Financial Times, December 12, 2008, 
sec. South America, https://www.ft.com/content/7170e224-c897-11dd-b86f-000077b07658. 
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satisfy an ideological dream. They [the government] defaulted because they believe that 
debt is something evil that keeps developing countries underdeveloped.”65 Ecuador later 
bought back a majority of those same loans for 35 cents on the dollar.66 During his first 
year in office, Correa imposed a 99% windfall tax on foreign oil companies, only lowering 
it to 70% when companies agreed to enter into negotiations.67 Eventually, several 
companies came to the table to negotiate. However, despite the new administration’s 
successful capture of a higher rent intake during surges in oil prices, author Antulio Rosales 
claims that the government did not protect itself during periods of low prices. In fact, after 
the drop in prices in 2014, Ecuador’s fixed service fee was higher than the international 
price of oil.68 The state was extracting at a loss while the oil companies still profited. 
Meanwhile, Correa doubled the size of the state.69 Overall, Correa and his predecessors 
established policies that were typical of states suffering from the resource curse, but 
Correa’s decision to borrow from Chinese development banks only magnified Ecuador’s 
problems.    
C. HOW CHINESE LOANS EXACERBATED THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Although Latin America was experiencing an overall commodity boom because of 
a rise in demand from China, Ecuador’s economy suffered in 2009 due to a drop in oil 
prices. Beginning in 2010, as oil prices declined, China substantially increased the amount 
and frequency of loans it provided to Ecuador. China’s influence continued to 
exponentially increase, and 70 Chinese companies were working in Ecuador by 2014.70 
By 2016, China was Ecuador’s largest lender and infrastructure contractor.71 From 2010 
 
65 Bunte, Raise the Debt, 90. 
66 Bunte, 102. 
67 Antulio Rosales, “Structural Constraints in Times of Resource Nationalism: Oil Policy and State 
Capacity in Post-Neoliberal Ecuador,” 85. 
68 Antulio Rosales, 87. 
69 “The Cost of Ecuador’s Surrender on Fuel Subsidies,” The Economist, October 17, 2019, 
https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2019/10/17/the-cost-of-ecuadors-surrender-on-fuel-subsidies. 
70 R. Evan Ellis, “Ecuador’s Leveraging of China to Pursue an Alternative Political and Development 
Path,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2018: 81. 
71 Garzón and Castro, “China-Ecuador Relations and the Development of the Hydro Sector,” 26. 
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to 2018, Ecuador borrowed an estimated $20.3 billion from China, or more than $1,100 
per capita.72 Approximately 70% of Chinese loans have interest rates between 6 and 
7.25%, compared to 2 to 4% given at many multilateral banks.73 Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of Chinese loans from 2005–2018 relative to the price of Ecuadorian oil.74 
 
Chinese loans followed years of low oil prices, supplementing lost revenue. Correa took 
office in January 2007, Moreno in May 2017.  
Figure 1. Chinese Loans to Ecuador and the Price of Oil in Ecuador.75 
 
72 Gallagher and Myers, “China-Latin America Finance Database,” June 10, 2019; Garzón and Castro, 
“China-Ecuador Relations and the Development of the Hydro Sector,” 24–30; “China Grants $5.3 Billion 
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Figure 1 graphs oil prices and Chinese loans between 2008 and 2018. The left Y 
axis shows the U.S. dollar loan amount, and the right Y axis shows the yearly price in oil. 
The figure indicates that the Correa administration pursued Chinese loans as oil prices fell 
sharply in an effort to compensate for the losses in the oil market. After the 2008 default, 
Chinese development banks were some of the only investors willing to risk their capital in 
Ecuador. In June of 2010, Ecuador struck a deal with China for its first loan of $1.68 
billion.76 For the next several years, Ecuador became even more dependent on Chinese 
trade and lending, plunging itself deeper into the resource curse. In the absence of oil 
revenues, the Correa government resorted to Chinese loans to weather the oil bust phases 
and used these loans, essentially, as a natural resource substitute. However, just as oil is an 
exhaustible resource, Chinese loans to Latin America are beginning to dry up due to a 
slowing Chinese economy and the logistical distances between the trading partners.77 
Therefore, future Ecuadorian leaders may find themselves in the same predicament as 
President Moreno, searching for acceptable austerity measures to stop the economic 
bleeding.        
Deriving from the literature discussed in Chapter I on how the resource curse affects 
politics and socioeconomics, this chapter examines the five specific characteristics that are 
central to the discussion of resource wealth and Chinese loans to Ecuador: ineffective 
institutions, authoritarian tendencies, dependence on resource wealth and negative trade 
balances, high government spending, and misguided public works.  
1. Characteristic 1: Ineffective Institutions  
According to the hypothesis presented in Chapter I, the traits specific to Chinese 
loans may cause heavily centralized decision-making and increase corruption. Based on 
corruption data and evidence from the Correa administration, Chinese loans seemed to 
intensify these resource curse characteristics. Loan negotiations with China during 
Correa’s presidency lacked transparency and conditionality, and the loans were managed 
 
76 Garzón and Castro, “China-Ecuador Relations and the Development of the Hydro Sector,” 28. 
77 Margaret Myers, “The Reasons for China’s Cooling Interest in Latin America,” accessed May 3, 
2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/how-beijing-sees-it. 
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by Correa and a few trusted supporters.78 Author Jonas Bunte interviewed several public 
debt officials in Ecuador that claimed the government typically received several competing 
credit offers from lenders that were willing to provide up to 85% of the funding for a given 
project, but that Chinese loans were typically chosen because the government could “use 
the loans in a way it would like.”79 Bunte claimed that “the financial terms of the offer are 
not a major factor in this process,” adding that the loans were chosen by politicians and 
“not technocrats.”80 Consequently, the decision-making process became more centralized, 
a trait susceptible to corruption in resource curse theory.  
Ecuadorian author and politician César Montúfar argues that the Correa 
administration demonstrated institutionalized corruption, and he finds that Ecuador’s 
Comptroller Office notes 2,408 reports of “criminal responsibilities” during the Correa 
administration.81 Therefore, corruption was widespread and not limited to interactions 
with China. However, China´s role as Ecuador’s main lender facilitated the 
institutionalized corruption. Multilateral organizations, such as the IMF, grant loans based 
on the condition that a government limits corruption and practices good governance.82 
Chinese loans to Ecuador did not have any governance-based conditionality attached. 
China routinely says that it does not interfere in the internal matters of other countries.83 
Loan details are consistently not published on government websites; instead, many figures 
are taken from local newspaper interviews with Ecuador’s finance ministers.84  
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Not only do Chinese loans produce the conditions for corruption, but Chinese 
companies have been implicated in corruption cases. In April of 2020, Correa was 
sentenced to eight years in prison and prohibited from running for office for 25 years.85 
The former president was convicted due to a scandal known as Arroz Verde.86 The accusers 
alleged that Correa’s political party, Alianza PAIS, received bribes from contracting 
companies. The scandal involved various companies, including Chinese contractors 
Sinohydro and China Gezhouba Group, both builders of hydroelectric facilities in 
Ecuador.87 Correa delegated several Chinese loan contracts and all of the hydroelectric 
projects to his vice president, Jorge Glas.88 Glas was also convicted in the new charges 
involving Chinese companies, and he had previously been found guilty of corruption and 
sentenced to six years in jail for receiving $13.5 million in bribes from Brazilian 
construction giant Odebrecht after the Operation Car Wash investigation.89 The lack of 
conditionality and magnitude of Chinese loans, along with corrupt practices from both 
Chinese contracting companies and Ecuadorian government officials, exacerbated the 
institutionalized corruption that occurred during the Correa administration.   
Figures 2 and 3 map executive corruption and regime corruption in Ecuador using 
data from the V-Dem Institute. The executive corruption index proposes to answer this 
question: “How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents, grant favors in 
exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, 
embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family 
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use?”90 The regime corruption index asks, “To what extent do political actors use political 
office for private or political gain?”91 The data allows an evaluation of whether there were 
any changes in levels of corruption identified in the years after Chinese loans were adopted. 
Figure 2 shows that executive corruption increased starting in 2010 after the first loan and 
continued rising until Correa left office. In Figure 3, the heaviest loan years—2015 and 
2016—were the most corrupt years. Additionally, executives and political actors 
maintained corruption levels when petroleum profits were at their lowest. Overall, the 
Correa administration appears to have sustained or even increased corrupt activity 
throughout the boom-and-bust cycles of petroleum, signifying that the inclusion of Chinese 
loans provided similar opportunities for corruption.        
     
Figure 2. Executive Corruption in Ecuador from V-Dem Institute.92 
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Figure 3. Regime Corruption in Ecuador from V-Dem Institute.93 
2. Characteristic 2: Authoritarian Tendencies 
According to the theory explained in Chapter I, Chinese loans may act similarly to 
resource rents, and therefore the resource curse, by reducing accountability for 
authoritarian leaders and allowing said leaders to hinder democratization by oppressing 
dissention and opposition. Existing literature has found that, under Correa’s government, 
Ecuador experienced a significant degree of autocratization. Figure 4 visualizes this 
autocratization process using the liberal democracy index calculated by the V-Dem 
Institute. While it is impossible to measure the direct relationship between Chinese loans 
and these autocratization tendencies, nonetheless, there are some indicators that point to 
the Correa administration’s direct use of Chinese loans to strengthen Correa’s hold on 
power both through increased corruption and through investments on intelligence 
technology. For instance, a Chinese loan of $240 million was used to purchase and install 
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the ECU 911 surveillance system in 2011.94 The new surveillance system feeds video from 
4,300 cameras directly to 16 police monitoring centers and the National Intelligence 
Secretariat (SENAIN) headquarters.95 Under Correa’s leadership, the government 
installed the ECU 911 system with facial recognition capabilities, and the intelligence 
community was accused of planting cameras directly outside of political opponents’ 
homes.96 Ecuadorian and Chinese employees cooperate to run the ECU 911 headquarters 
in Quito, and around 20 Chinese engineers keep the system up and running.97 Chinese 
media credits the ECU 911 for falling crime rates in Ecuador, but the success is 
controversial due to the system’s features and questionable employment.98 
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The Liberal Democracy Index for Ecuador shows autocratization during the Correa 
administration and especially during Chinese loan years. 
Figure 4. Ecuador: The Liberal Democracy Index 99 
Beyond this, the process of autocratization was further enabled by the conditions 
of the loan agreements. China offered grace periods for several of the loans that Ecuador 
took during the Correa government. This meant that the Correa administration could pay 
interest only and leave the bulk of the debt burden to Correa’s successor, likely generating 
the conditions for economic crisis and setting the stage for eroding the legitimacy of any 
political actor that followed.  
When President Moreno entered office in May of 2017, he found that he had 
inherited at least $8 billion of Chinese debt in addition to a commitment to ship 90% of all 
crude oil to China through 2024 as a part of Correa’s loan-for-oil deals.100 Figure 5 shows 
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the distribution of payment periods for all Chinese loans and shows that Correa was able 
to saddle Moreno with the biggest portion of the debt. Moreno, who was also Correa’s vice 
president from 2007–2013, supposedly did not know how much oil Correa had committed 
to China.101 Vicente Albornoz, the dean of economics at the University of the Americas 
in Quito remarked, “Correa thought he was a genius and he has escaped accountability by 
giving the problem to someone else.”102 When Chinese loans dried up, Moreno was forced 
into austerity measures to receive lending from the IMF. Unfortunately, a reduced tolerance 
for austerity in the civilian population is a characteristic of the resource curse, and 
Moreno’s approval rating fell to less than 20%.103 This leaves the door open for Correa if 
he can successfully appeal his recent conviction and prohibition from running for public 
office. In 2018, Ecuador passed a referendum under Moreno that brought back presidential 
term limits after Correa eliminated them in 2015.104 However, the former president still 
expresses interest in returning to politics in Ecuador, possibly even as vice president, a feat 
fellow leftist President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner achieved in Argentina.105 If Correa 
or his new political party the Movimiento Revolución Ciudadana are able to return to 
power in future elections, Ecuador´s debts to China and the resulting austerity measures 
may be the cause.     
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Figure 5. The Moreno Administration is Left With a Heavy Debt Burden. 
Author’s Elaboration.  
Overall, Chinese loans funded a surveillance system and helped export China’s 
authoritarian-like execution of the system. Additionally, the loans gave Correa a political 
advantage by saddling his political opponents with debt and unpopular austerity measures. 
Correa used the nontax revenue from China to suppress his political opponents and avoid 
accountability.    
3. Characteristic 3: Dependence on Resource Wealth and Negative Trade 
Balance 
If Chinese loans exacerbated the resource curse in Ecuador, the expectation is that 
Ecuador overinvested in its resource industry and neglected domestic value-added 
manufacturing. It is also expected that the loans produced dependence on China and an 
unbalanced trading relationship with China. Figures 6 and 7 show that Ecuador did indeed 
increase energy production for both petroleum and natural gas. Beginning in 2010 and 
coinciding with the Chinese loans, Ecuador ramped up its extraction of petroleum and 
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natural gas after a lull in the beginning of Correa’s presidency. Figure 8 shows that the 
Correa administration relied less on tax income while government expenditures 
skyrocketed during the second hydrocarbon boom from 2011–2014. Direct taxes such as 
income tax were particularly stagnant throughout Correa’s presidency. This indicates that 
the Correa administration became more dependent on resource rents to fund Ecuador’s 
expanding budget.   
Figure 8 also shows a continual rise in government spending through the first 
hydrocarbon price drop in 2009. This is particularly significant because Ecuador received 
$11.5 billion in oil rents in 2009, but only $6.1 billion in 2010 when the price drop took 
full effect. While profits fell in Ecuador, China’s energy consumption soared and its 
construction capacity overflowed into several states with infrastructure needs. Over the 
next four years, Ecuador filled its investment gap with more than $6 billion of Chinese 
loans that were invested directly into energy projects built mostly with Chinese 
construction.106 Altogether, $7 billion was designated for loan-for-oil contracts with 
China.107 Due to these loans, Ecuador was still able to heavily invest in energy despite an 
economic lull and without the technological ability to execute many of the projects. 
Meanwhile, the government sold future resource production in the form of loan-for-oil 
deals, falling deeper into dependence on the future of the energy sector. 
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Figure 6. Ecuador’s Production of Petroleum in Millions of barrels/day.108 
 
Figure 7. Ecuador’s Production of Natural Gas in billions of cubic feet.109 
 
108 Source: Ecuador. U.S. Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/international/
overview/world. 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018







2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Ecuador: Natural Gas Production (bcf)
34 
 
Figure 8. Ecuador’s Government Expenditure Compared to Direct and 
Indirect Taxes.110 
Since 2000, Ecuador has used the U.S. dollar, a currency that has continually 
increased in value relative to other world currencies. The IMF explains that formal 
dollarization is a trade-off. Ecuador is better protected against unstable inflation and 
interest rates, but the regime lacks flexibility and the ability to respond to shocks to the 
economy.111 Due to Ecuador’s strong currency, the country’s exports are relatively more 
expensive and therefore less attractive than competing countries’ exports. In addition to a 
strong dollar, demand for raw resources from China has caused export primarization in 
many Latin American countries.112 Primarization occurs when a country relies on primary 
goods such as crude oil rather than manufacturing value-added products. To add to this 
unbalance, loans from China included obligations to use Chinese contractors, and therefore 
Ecuador did not receive a technology transfer that could have boosted its manufacturing. 
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Partially due to these factors, Ecuador’s manufacturing stagnated around 14% of GDP from 
2005–2019.113 Moreover, Ecuador’s agricultural shipments to China are typically 
undercut by China’s neighbors that do not have heavy transportation costs to overcome.114 
The result was a heavy trade deficit with China that pushed Ecuador into several years of 
overall trade deficits. This effect is seen in Figures 9 and 10. In Figure 9, China’s exports 
destined for Ecuador tripled from 2009 to 2014 while Ecuador’s exports to China did not 
significantly increase until Correa left office in 2017. The overall effect of primarization 
and unbalanced trade with China is seen in Figure 10. Even during the hydrocarbon boom 
from late 2010 to 2014, Ecuador’s overall trade balance was a deficit.  
In summary, traditional Chinese loans and loans for oil allowed Ecuador to heavily 
invest in the energy sector even when hydrocarbon prices were down, exacerbating 
dependence on resource wealth. Dependence on resource wealth combined with 
dependence on Chinese loans, Chinese construction, and Chinese manufacturing, stunted 
the growth of value-added manufacturing in Ecuador. The overall result was less 
competitive Ecuadorian exports and several years with overall trade deficits.       
 
113 CEIC Data. Ceicdata.com. 




Figure 9. Bilateral Trade between Ecuador and China.115 
 
Ecuador’s trade balance suffered even with high oil prices from 2011–2014. Loans from 
China began in 2010 
Figure 10. Ecuador’s Overall Trade Deficit.116  
 
115 Adapted from CEIC Data. Ceicdata.com. 
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4. Characteristic 4: High Government Spending 
If Chinese loans exacerbate the resource curse, it is expected that Chinese lending 
reduces incentives to save and allows Ecuador to maintain high government expenditures 
through the boom-and-bust of the resource market. As seen previously in Figure 8, the 
trademark of the populist Correa administration was high government spending. In the 
beginning of Correa’s presidency, social spending was sorely needed. In 2006, a year 
before Correa took office, social spending was 4.3% of GDP, far less than the 9 percent 
average in Latin America.117 However, Ecuador soon kept pace with the rest of Latin 
America. As the GDP rose steadily, the size of the public sector increased dramatically, 
jumping from 25 to 44% of GDP.118 Social spending quadrupled during Correa’s 
presidency, and the former president maintained this budget through two hydrocarbon bust 
phases by borrowing $12 billion in Chinese loans specifically earmarked to cover budget 
deficits.119 Meanwhile, poverty and inequality levels improved due to several years of high 
government spending.  
Despite record low numbers for poverty and inequality, Ecuador’s government did 
not build the economy to sustain commodity busts. Four years after the peak in 2014, 
Ecuador’s GDP per capita had declined more than 4%. A report from the United Nations 
University claims that the improvements during the commodity boom are unsustainable 
and will be reversed unless there is a substantial increase in the price of oil.120 Poverty has 
slightly risen since reaching a low in 2014.121 Likewise, Ecuador’s GINI index and the 
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wealth held by the poorest 10% of the population have both decreased since 2014.122 The 
Economist estimated in 2014 that Ecuador’s government needed the price of oil to be more 
than $120 a barrel to sustain its budget.123 That same year oil prices were cut in half to less 
than $60 a barrel, and the lower valuation became the trend for the rest of the decade. Thus, 
Chinese loans enabled Correa to maintain unsustainable populist spending in Ecuador 
despite two bust phases, jeopardizing Ecuador’s socioeconomic gains from the boom 
phases and amplifying the effects of the resource curse.     
The hollow center of Ecuador’s artificially strong economy was the lack of liquid 
fiscal buffers. In other words, the Correa administration did not save money while oil prices 
were high. Figure 11 graphs Ecuador’s total reserves as a percentage of total external debt. 
As seen in the figure, Ecuador’s total reserves in relation to debt dropped considerably 
during Correa’s presidency. Instead of saving for potential busts, the administration 
increased spending. In 2008, the administration dissolved the country’s economic 
stabilization funds and transferred the money—about 2.3% GDP—to the spending 
accounts of the Treasury.124 As oil prices fell less than two years later, Ecuador received 
its first loan from Chinese Development Banks. To begin operations on the Coca Codo 
Sinclair dam, Ecuador borrowed $1.68 billion from the China Ex-Im Bank at 6.9%, an 
interest rate 2% higher than the U.S. Ex-Im rates for Ecuador at the time.125 Although 
Ecuador’s savings rate actually increased during Correa’s presidency, the savings were 
mainly reinvested into energy and infrastructure, which are illiquid assets.126 Instead of 
saving Ecuador’s windfalls during the oil boom, the Correa administration relied on 
Chinese loans to bail out Ecuador’s economy during shocks in the market.  
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Figure 11. Ecuador’s Reserves in Decline during Correa’s Presidency.127 
In summary, the Correa administration benefited from a booming oil market and 
brought social spending to more normal levels. However, the Ecuadorian economy was 
fragile at the core because Correa neglected savings. The government increased savings 
too quickly and did not plan for a price drop in the oil market. Chinese loans allowed 
Ecuador to drastically increase its budget, and then maintain that budget without vital 
savings, intensifying the resource curse by removing the incentives of frugality.  
5. Characteristic 5: Misguided Public Works    
In accordance with the hypothesis, it is expected that Chinese loans increase white 
elephant projects and incomplete projects because the loans provide large sums of money, 
but future Chinese investments are not guaranteed. This resource curse characteristic is 
detrimental to a country because political projects are chosen without discernment. The 
evidence shows that Ecuador initiated several controversial projects during the Correa 
administration, and China funded or built many of them.  
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To become less dependent on imported refined oil, Correa began development on 
a $12 billion, 300,000-barrel-a-day refinery named the Refinery of the Pacific.128 Since 
Ecuador currently imports some refined hydrocarbon products, the new project would help 
Ecuador increase domestic refining. However, many criticized the chosen location of the 
refinery and the high price tag. Correa chose the region of Manabí—the third most 
populated in Ecuador—arguably for political purposes. The nearby port in Manta was not 
capable of handling the capacity at the time, and the nearest crude oil pipeline was over 
250 kilometers away.129 Additionally, critics and competitors balked at the size of the 
project, even at the original price tag of $6 billion. The president of Peru’s state-owned oil 
company claimed that “getting $1 billion in financing for [Peru’s refinery] Talara has been 
a heroic task. I really do not see where Ecuador will raise $6 billion. This seems impossible 
today.”130 The project began without Chinese involvement, but a CDB and Chinese 
petroleum company signed a contract to complete the project and gain operational 
control.131 China signed a financing agreement totaling $7 billion, with the rest expected 
to come from Venezuela and Petroecuador.132 However, China later pulled out of the 
contract. President Moreno recently decided to scrap the project and liquidate the assets to 
regain some of the $1.53 billion initially invested.133  
Another controversial Ecuadorian investment was the development of Ecuador’s 
hydroelectric sector. Seven of the eight major hydroelectric projects were built by Chinese 
contractors, and six were financed by Chinese banks.134 Altogether the projects are 
 
128 “Ecuador’s Refinery Dream Seems More of a Fantasy: Fuel for Thought - Platts Insight,” accessed 
March 21, 2020, https://blogs.platts.com/2016/02/15/ecuadors-refinery-dream-fuel-for-thought/. 
129 “Ecuador’s Refinery Dream Seems More of a Fantasy: Fuel for Thought - Platts Insight.” 
130 Lucien Chauvin, “Manta Takes on Peru,” LatinFinance, 2008. 
131 “Ecuador’s Refinery Dream Seems More of a Fantasy: Fuel for Thought - Platts Insight”; R. Evan 
Ellis, “China’s Role in Ecuador’s Oil Sector,” The Dialogue, January 23, 2014, 
https://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2014/01/chinas-role-in-ecuadors-oil-sector/. 
132 “Ecuador Infrastructure Report - Q4 2016” (London, United Kingdom: Business Monitor 
International Ltd, 2016), 25. 
133 “BNamericas - Spotlight: Ecuador’s Pacífico Refinery Proje..,” BNamericas.com, accessed March 
21, 2020, https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/spotlight-ecuadors-pacifico-refinery-project-revisited. 
134 Garzón and Castro, “China-Ecuador Relations and the Development of the Hydro Sector,” 36. 
41 
projected to cost over $5.8 billion and be 15% over budget.135 Critics say the hydroelectric 
plants will produce an excess amount of electricity with no export customers, and that the 
proposed hydroelectric plants harm the environment by altering the flow of rivers and 
contaminating the water for citizens downstream.136 Additionally, critics contend that the 
funds could have been used to finance genuinely clean energy projects, such as wind or 
solar farms.  
Ecuador’s biggest hydroelectric project, the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, is perhaps the 
most controversial. The site chosen had been rejected by previous governments because it 
was near the base of a volcano and considered a risk for earthquake damage.137 The 
hydroelectric project was built and financed by China and projected to finish in 2014, but 
actually completed in 2016. Since completion, dam operators have experienced major 
issues. The New York Times reported in 2018 that the dam was operating at only half 
capacity, saying “thousands of cracks are splintering the dam’s machinery.” Its reservoir is 
clogged with silt, sand and trees. And the only time engineers tried to throttle up the facility 
completely, it shook violently and shorted out the national electricity grid.138 Some reports 
now say that the dam may have caused the disappearance of Ecuador’s largest waterfall.139 
Overall, considering the Coca Codo Sinclair dam was “the largest investment in the 
country’s history” according to the Ecuadorian government, the results have been 
disappointing.140   
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In summary, the scale and amount of the controversial energy projects would not 
have been possible without financing and expertise from China. Due to the availability of 
massive loans from China and the help of Chinese construction firms, the Correa 
administration did not have to conservatively plan public works. Therefore, the projects 
may have been well-meaning, albeit political, but the proposed scale and execution of the 
projects was misguided. Overall, the evidence indicates that China’s involvement in 
Ecuador exacerbated the selection of misguided public works.   
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this chapter finds that loans from Chinese development banks 
exacerbated the resource curse in Ecuador. President Correa and his administration were 
responsible for the shortsighted economic and political missteps with Ecuador’s oil wealth, 
but Chinese capital added fuel to the fire. This is not the first time Ecuador has suffered 
from the resource curse, but lending from China added an extra element. Chinese loans are 
unique because they are opaque, high interest, and lack the conditionality of multilateral 
loans. These factors permitted centralized decision-making, more corruption, and allowed 
Correa to oppress political opponents. The loans also helped build an Ecuadorian economy 
that became more dependent on energy and high social spending. Additionally, Ecuador 
became more dependent on China itself. Finally, Chinese lending allowed the Correa 
administration to incautiously spend on large public works because lending was 
consistently available. However, China’s economy is slowing and the loans are drying up. 
President Moreno may have to look elsewhere for loans in the future while hoping that 
austerity measures do not bring back populism.       
43 
III. HOW BOLIVIA MITIGATED THE RESOURCE CURSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In November of 2019, President Evo Morales stepped down from power at the 
military’s request after almost 14 years as president of Bolivia. Morales fled to Mexico and 
was eventually granted asylum in Argentina.141 When the interim government took over 
on November 12, they inherited one of the healthiest economies in the region. Under Evo 
Morales, Bolivia’s poverty and inequality figures were slashed. Bolivia’s poverty gap at 
$5.50 a day fell from 27.5% in 2005 to 9.3 in 2018.142 Bolivia’s GDP per capita more than 
tripled in 14 years.143 The poorest 10% of the Bolivian population tripled their share of 
income, while the top 10% relinquished a third of their share.144 Bolivia’s GINI index—a 
measure of inequality based on distribution of income—fell 15% during the same 
period.145 During this time frame, Bolivia outpaced its neighbors in the region. Bolivia’s 
real per capita GDP grew at twice the rate of the LAC region.146 Furthermore, even after 
the commodity prices dipped in the last five years of Morales’s presidency, Bolivia 
achieved the highest per capita growth in South America.147 Bolivia was especially 
outperforming its ALBA allies, who became highly indebted to China. Politically, Bolivia 
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was reeling, but economically, it was experiencing a steady, sustainable growth. How did 
Bolivia maintain economic growth while other countries stagnated or crashed? 
Overall, Bolivia was able to mitigate the resource curse with conservative 
macroeconomic policies. Bolivia rode out the commodity bust due to economic 
decentralization, high savings, a high performing energy sector, relatively low spending, 
and low foreign debt. Bolivia benefited greatly from the nationalization of its hydrocarbon 
sector and the boom that followed. However, the government of Bolivia capitalized on the 
windfall with strong policy decisions and cautious investing. 
B. THE HISTORY OF THE RESOURCE CURSE IN BOLIVIA 
Beginning with the Spanish mining of silver in Potosí, single commodities have 
dominated the history of Bolivia’s economy. The Spanish crown mined the region during 
colonial times and shipped silver back to the Iberian Peninsula. Tin replaced silver as the 
major extractive resource, and the new Bolivian government was eventually dominated by 
three tin-mining families.148 After the collapse of the international tin market in the 1980s, 
natural gas took over as Bolivia’s top export and became the centerpiece of the Bolivian 
economy.149 Each one of these natural resources plagued Bolivia with the resource curse. 
Profits were siphoned off by political elites, the public sector swelled to unsustainable 
budgets, and the Bolivian economy crashed each time a commodity tanked.  
Bolivia alternated between periods of privatization and nationalization of its natural 
resources. During the revolution of 1952, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) 
overthrew the established elites and nationalized Bolivian tin.150 However, over the next 
decade, the MNR slowly rolled back resource nationalism and partially privatized both the 
hydrocarbon and mining industries.151 The MNR intended to diversify and industrialize 
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the economy, but by 1970, minerals still formed 91% of the Bolivian economy.152 The 
Bolivian military took over in the 1970s and used external development financing for 
Bolivia’s natural resource industries, producing unsustainable debt servicing in the 
1980s.153 Eventually, Bolivia returned to democratic rule and resorted to an IMF-backed 
stabilization plan while fully privatizing its mining industry.154        
Bolivia privatized much of the hydrocarbon industry held by the state-owned 
company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) in 1996, and lowered 
royalties to increase new discovery.155 Several major discoveries followed, and gas 
reserves jumped 350% from 2000 to 2005 and propelled Bolivia to the second-highest level 
of reserves behind Venezuela.156 Additionally, Brazil became a major consumer of gas in 
the late 1990s, and Bolivia’s geographic location bordering both Brazil and Argentina 
favored the Bolivian gas market.157 The result was an 820% increase in exports from 2000 
to 2006.158    
The historical significance of natural resources culminated in a series of mass 
mobilizations against local and national governments from 2000 to 2005. First, a period of 
violence occurred in Bolivia over the government-backed eradication of coca. In 2000, the 
citizens of Cochabamba successfully protested against the privatization of water in their 
city. In October 2003, protests broke out over the central government’s proposal to export 
unrefined natural gas to the United States at reduced prices.159 Evo Morales and his 
political party, Movement to Socialism (MAS), were at the head of the protests demanding 
nationalization of Bolivia’s natural resources. The president of Bolivia at the time, 
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President Sánchez de Lozada, subsequently resigned due to the violent protests and Carlos 
Mesa took over. President Mesa tried to alleviate the conflict by organizing a referendum 
to vote on the nationalization of natural gas, but eventually resigned in 2005 after declaring 
that he “cannot continue to govern with threats that strangle the country.”160 
After the resignation of Mesa, Evo Morales won a landslide election and was 
inaugurated as president of Bolivia in early 2006. Although Morales was not new to 
politics, he rode a grassroots movement as a political outsider and became the first 
indigenous president of Bolivia. By winning the election, Morales united a wide variety of 
groups that were against the status quo in Bolivia.161 Morales was a coca farmer twho 
demanded the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, claimed to be against neoliberal 
policies, and supported decentralization of the government. However, despite his anti-
neoliberal rhetoric, Morales’s incoming administration was given $1.7 billion in debt 
reduction as an early boost.162 When Morales took charge in January 2006, the Bolivian 
gas conflict ended, and the Bolivian population and economy were poised for a more 
complete nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry.  
C. HOW BOLIVIA MITIGATED THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The result of the Bolivian gas conflict was a new hydrocarbon law in 2005 that set 
the foundation for the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector. The new law had three 
key elements:  
(i) taxes on production (royalties and a direct hydrocarbons tax), were raised 
to 50 percent; (ii) the role of the state energy company, YPFB, was restored 
into that of a more active market participant that would also intermediate all 
contracts to export natural gas and become the only importer and wholesale 
distributor of fuel products; and (iii) existing contracts for hydrocarbons 
production would be renegotiated for compliance with the new law.163   
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The direct tax on hydrocarbons—IDH for the Spanish acronym—was instituted one 
year before the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry.164 One hundred days into 
Morales’s presidency, the Bolivian leader sent troops into the gas fields to take over 
production and complete the nationalization according to the new hydrocarbon law. 
However, the nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia essentially became a 
tax hike. Morales and the Bolivian government forced private firms to renegotiate royalties 
and terms after Bolivia did not have the capital to buy ownership and take over 
production.165 Nevertheless, due to the new contracts and previous exploration, 
hydrocarbon revenue skyrocketed from $338 million in 2004 to $2.7 billion in 2008.166 
During this time frame, Bolivia began to invest in foreign reserves at an unprecedented 
level. Foreign reserves are held in part to ensure countries can maintain budgets during 
bust markets and attract investors. Figure 12 plots Bolivia’s foreign reserves in comparison 
to the market price of natural gas, Bolivia’s most important export. As seen in Figure 12, 
as natural gas prices rose, the Morales administration set aside more and more savings in 
the form of foreign reserves. When the market dipped in 2009, investments began to flatten, 
but picked up again when the market rebounded. After the second bust at the end of 2014, 
Bolivia started to tap into its foreign reserves as designed to balance payments and protect 
the economy.  
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Bolivia´s foreign reserves increased as the price of natural gas rose. Bolivia dipped into those 
savings when prices fell. 
Figure 12. Bolivia´s Foreign Reserves and the Price of Natural Gas.167 
These foreign reserves enabled Bolivia to maintain its financial independence 
during the bust phases of natural gas. The Morales administration did receive $2.4 billion 
in development loans from Chinese banks between 2009 and 2016. Yet, as Figure 13 
illustrates by comparing Chinese loans and foreign reserves during Morales’s presidency, 
such loans were dwarfed by foreign reserve totals. China held $916.6 million, or 
approximately 9% of Bolivia´s $10.5 billion foreign debt, as of 2019, and is the most 
significant bilateral lender by a distance. However, the availability of significant foreign 
reserves demonstrates that Bolivia has the ability to pay down the loans.168 While Bolivia’s 
extensive economic reliance on natural resources made the country vulnerable to the 
resource curse, the country’s vast foreign reserves nonetheless enabled it to avoid having 
to resort to foreign loans to weather the downturns from the commodities market. 
 
167 Adapted from CEIC Data. Ceicdata.com. 
168 “Informe de La Deuda Externa Pública” (Banco Central de Bolivia, Gerencia de Operaciones 

















2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Bolivia´s Foreign Reserves
with Price of Natural Gas
Foreign Exchange Reserves in $ Millions (Left Y Axis)
Natural Gas $ per 1000 Cub ft (Right Y Axis)
49 
Figure 13. Chinese Loans to Bolivia and Bolivia´s Foreign Reserves.169  
Deriving from the literature discussed in Chapter I on how the resource curse affects 
politics and socioeconomics, this chapter will assess how Bolivia was affected during the 
years of Morales’s presidency. The expectation is that Bolivia will still experience the 
effects of the resource curse, but that policy decisions by the Bolivian government and 
limited usage of Chinese loans protected the economy from an aggravated curse.  
1. Characteristic 1: Ineffective Institutions 
In Chapter I, the literature established that a state that suffers from the resource 
curse will often experience centralized decision-making because IOCs and foreign capital 
need a bargaining partner. Over-centralization with a few decision makers decreases 
transparency and leads to corruption. In Chapter II, Ecuador first centralized to become a 
bargaining partner while renegotiating with the IOCs, continued centralizing to cut deals 
bilaterally with China, and finally experienced exacerbated corruption due to centralized 
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decision-making and opaque Chinese loans. In this section, evidence concerning decision 
making and corruption in Bolivia will be examined to determine if conservative 
macroeconomic policies mitigated this characteristic of the resource curse. The evidence 
suggests that the government experienced decentralization before and during the beginning 
of Morales’s administration. Decentralization may have prevented Morales from having 
the funds to fully nationalize and the authority to execute large Chinese loans—two 
opportunities that could have potentially increased corruption.  
In 1994, Bolivia passed the Law of Popular Participation, which shifted 20% of the 
national budget to Bolivia’s 311 municipalities, and 5% to universities.170 Subsequent 
laws further decentralized the government, including the IDH and the new national 
constitution passed during Morales’s presidency in 2009.171 After the IDH was 
implemented, “55 percent of hydrocarbon revenue and 20% of other tax revenue” was 
distributed to subnational governments and universities.172 In 2010 the IMF declared that 
Bolivia showed “a strong commitment to decentralization and regional autonomy,” 
especially concerning the distribution of hydrocarbon revenue.173 To the IMF, 
decentralization was encouraging, but for China, the trend was troubling. Author R. Evan 
Ellis claims China viewed the dispersion of power as unstable, and that China proceeded 
cautiously with loans because it was wary of “regional demands for autonomy.”174 
Therefore, the Morales administration did not present itself as a reliable centralized 
decision maker for the Chinese.     
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As is expected in a resource-rich country, corruption still occurred in Bolivia’s 
central government. During Morales’s presidency, the largest threat to corruption was the 
state capitalist model, and specifically the power of the state-owned hydrocarbon entity, 
YPFB. Overall, YPFB was not trusted by Bolivians, with 74% of the population believing 
there was corruption in the organization.175 Two incidents involving the energy sector 
threatened to encompass Morales himself, but criticism was deflected to those directly 
implicated. In 2009, Santo Ramírez, president of YPFB and political ally of Morales, was 
embroiled in a bribery scandal. The courier of a $450,000 bribe destined for Ramírez was 
robbed and murdered, and Ramírez was sentenced to 12 years in prison when it was found 
he was accepting bribes.176 After initially defending Ramírez, Morales fired his political 
ally the next day. In 2016, Morales’s former girlfriend Gabriela Zapata was convicted of 
embezzlement and accused of using her influence to win state contracts valued at $576 
million for the Chinese construction firm where she worked.177 Morales denied any 
involvement and called on the Bolivian congress to investigate.178 Morales eventually 
escaped any direct responsibility in the case.       
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Figure 14. Executive Corruption in Bolivia from V-Dem Institute.179 
 
Figure 15. Regime Corruption in Bolivia from V-Dem Institute.180 
Although consolidating the hydrocarbon sector into the state-owned YPFB created 
an opportunity for corruption, decentralized profit-sharing reduced corruption in the central 
government of Bolivia. Figure 14 indicates that executive corruption fell sharply in the 
middle years of Morales’s presidency, and Figure 15 shows a gradual decline in regime 
corruption. Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate that, overall, the Morales administration 
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reduced central government corruption throughout their nearly 14 years in office. Author 
Benjamin Kohl explains that instead of high-level corruption, the issue may have been 
spread to the department and municipal levels in Bolivia, in what he calls a 
“decentralization of corruption.” However, Fisman and Gatti discovered an overall 
negative correlation between corruption and decentralization in 1999, and many 
multilateral organizations such as the World Bank agree that decentralization improves 
accountability by placing governmental control closer to the population.181 Therefore, it 
appears Bolivia’s decentralization offset some of the dangers of the state-capitalist model. 
Overall, decentralization in Bolivia appears to have reduced corruption in the 
central government by dispersing resource revenue and reducing economic decision- 
making power for Morales. Therefore, China did not view Morales as a stable centralized 
bargaining partner and only provided limited lending to Bolivia. Bolivia still experienced 
corruption from resource revenue, but the central government did not receive substantial 
nontax revenue in the form of opaque loans from China. Instead of significant funds in the 
hands of a few leaders, decentralization in Bolivia brought decision-making closer to the 
level of the population, producing more accountability and less corruption.  
2. Characteristic 2: Authoritarian Tendencies 
According to the resource curse literature, resource-rich nations tend to produce 
leaders with authoritarian tendencies. In Ecuador’s case, resource rents provided Correa 
with the funds to consolidate power and burden political opponents, and loans with few 
restrictions from China magnified Correa’s ability to do it. Since Bolivia accepted fewer 
loans from China and set aside foreign reserves, it is expected that Morales’s authoritarian 
tendencies were constrained due to a lack of funds. As discussed in Chapter I, author 
Michael Ross claims that one reason resource-rich authoritarians stay in power is because 
they can buy public support and the loyalty of the military.182 There is no question that 
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Morales displayed authoritarian tendencies during his presidency, but evidence in this 
section suggests that Morales possessed limited ability to concentrate power because he 
lacked funds to buy public support and the military’s loyalty. Overall, Morales eroded 
Bolivia’s democracy and China eventually increased financial support, but the support was 
delayed and inadequate, and did not sustain Morales’s presidency.    
Morales became increasingly more authoritarian during his presidency. The New 
York Times stated that Morales “steadily tightened his grip on power, prosecuting 
opposition figures, packing the courts and electoral boards with allies and unleashing bands 
of his supporters to intimidate opponents.”183 Figure 4 displays the liberal democracy 
index in Bolivia during Morales’s presidency. Although Morales was democratically albeit 
controversially elected four times, Figure 16 indicates that he chipped away at Bolivia’s 
democracy. In fact, Morales was able to run for a fourth term when the stacked judicial 
system ruled that his “human rights would have been violated were he not on the ballot.”184 
Morales resorted to the courts after waning support from the public resulted in the rejection 
of a constitutional amendment that included scrapping term limits.185 The referendum 
occurred during a downturn in commodity prices, and as the narrative in characteristic 4 
will later demonstrate, social spending by the Morales administration was not as 
clientelistic as advertised by political opponents. Therefore, Morales was able to 
consolidate power within the central government, but he was not able to buy off citizens 
as is typical of resource-rich authoritarians.  
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Figure 16. The Liberal Democracy Index During Morales’s Presidency Shows 
an Erosion of Democracy.186 
In addition to diminishing public support, Morales was not able to buy off the 
Bolivian military and police forces. China did provide the Morales administration with 
military and security gifts and loans, but the support was not enough to secure Morales’s 
fourth term in office and continued autocratization. China donated equipment and provided 
loans to Bolivia for security reasons, including a gift of 120 motorcycles, 43 military 
transport vehicles, and a $38.3 million loan in order to lease military aircraft.187 However, 
outfitting the military and police and purging military leadership that cooperated with the 
United States in the transfer of obsolete Chinese munitions was not enough.188 Author 
John Otis contends that even though Morales gained early favor with the military and 
police because of his background as a veteran, his ideology and refusal to meet pension 
and salary demands reduced his influence, and contributed to his removal in 2019.189 After 
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the military disobeyed Morales’s orders to squash protests, and the police abandoned guard 
of the presidential palace in La Paz, the head of the Armed Forces—a Morales loyalist—
asked the controversially elected president to step down.190       
Although Morales was ultimately not able to hold onto power, China’s confidence 
in his authority grew as his presidency continued and as Morales consolidated power. 
During the first ten years of the Morales administration, China only lent $1.5 billion to 
Bolivia.191 However, in late 2015, China created a $7 billion line of credit for Bolivia and 
then increased that total to $10 billion in 2016.192 The line of credit was sparingly used, 
with only $835 million executed during that time frame according to the China-Latin 
America Finance database. Despite minimal funding in the end, at least one of the 
implemented projects had shades of authoritarianism. The BOL-110 surveillance system 
was ordered in 2016, and financed and built by China. The system is limited in scope 
compared to Ecuador’s ECU 911 system, but the Bolivian system does have facial 
recognition technology.193 Since the first phase of installation in 2019, there does not 
appear to be any evidence that the $105 million system has been used to oppress political 
opponents.194 
Overall, the Morales administration eroded Bolivia’s democracy, but it does not 
appear that resource rents or Chinese loans played a significant role in autocratization 
because Morales had limited access to the funds. Resource rents were partially dispersed 
due to the IDH, or invested into foreign reserves. Additionally, Morales had limited access 
to Chinese loans initially. Morales did not completely buy off citizens, as indicated by the 
referendum results and extensive protests in November 2019. Furthermore, Morales was 
not able to buy the loyalty of the military, a factor that has prolonged authoritarian rule in 
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neighboring countries. If Morales had secured more financing from China, it is possible 
the autocratization could have been expanded or prolonged.          
3. Characteristic 3: Dependence on Resource Wealth and Negative Trade 
Balance 
Resource-rich countries have natural incentives to continually invest in the resource 
industry; however, this usually results in the neglect of other industries and negative trade 
balances. According to the hypothesis in Chapter I, China’s lending is similar to resource 
wealth because both will increase an economy’s investments in resource extraction and 
unbalance trading relationships. In Chapter II, Ecuador became increasingly dependent on 
resource wealth and Chinese loans, and as a result, its trade balances suffered. This section 
will examine Bolivia’s hydrocarbon production and trade balances with China and the 
world to determine if Bolivia experienced a normal or mitigated resource curse in terms of 
dependency. In general, this thesis finds that Bolivia suffered from the resource curse as is 
expected of a resource-rich nation without significant Chinese lending. Bolivia was not 
able to avoid dependence on its resource wealth, which produced negative trade balances 
after the dip in commodity prices. However, Bolivia did not become dependent on foreign 
capital to fund resource investment.  
Bolivia relied heavily on resource extraction during the presidency of Morales. 
Figure 17 demonstrates that during the Morales administration, Bolivia increased 
production of petroleum. However, petroleum is insignificant in Bolivia compared to the 
Bolivian natural gas market. Figure 18 shows a heavy increase in natural gas production in 
Bolivia. Due to massive natural gas discoveries in the early 2000s, Bolivia began the 
nationalization process under Morales with huge reserves of natural gas. Reserves were 
estimated at 24 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2006 when Bolivian troops marched into the gas 
fields.195 However, after massive extraction, reserves dropped to 9.9 tcf in 2014 when 
commodity prices plunged and production tailed off.196 Álvaro Ríos, the former Minister 
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of Hydrocarbons, explains that there is an uncertain future for the hydrocarbon market due 
to the upcoming 2020 elections in Bolivia and the changing natural gas market in 
surrounding countries.197 Ríos acquiesces that the nationalization of the hydrocarbon 
industry was popular, but that a major reform of the oil and gas sector is vital to Bolivia’s 
future. The government claims that only 10% of Bolivia has been explored for 
hydrocarbons.198 However, Ríos contends exploration is not likely under the current 
circumstances: “there is no way we can continue looking for oil and gas with a 50% 
minimum royalty at the wellhead.”199 Under Bolivia’s constitution, YPFB is the only 
company allowed to undertake hydrocarbon exploration.200 Any company wishing to 
undergo exploration must create a joint stock company with YPFB or create a service 
contract with the state-owned company.201 Overall, Bolivia became dependent specifically 
on the extraction of natural gas, and while nationalization allowed immense levels of 
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Figure 17. Bolivia’s Production of Petroleum in Millions of barrels/day.202 
Figure 18. Ecuador’s Production of Natural Gas in billions of cubic feet.203 
Until the drop in commodity prices in 2014, taxes in Bolivia kept pace with 
government expenditures. In Figure 19, direct and indirect taxes are graphed as a 
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percentage of expenses. Direct taxes in Bolivia are specifically income tax. Although 
Bolivia’s informal sector is relatively large compared to other countries in South America, 
Bolivia still ranked third in South America behind Brazil and Argentina in terms of tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP.204 Consequently, relatively high direct taxes indicates 
greater social accountability from taxpayers that want control over government 
expenditures. Social accountability plays a large factor in reducing misguided public 
works, a concept that will be discussed in characteristic 5. For Bolivia’s indirect taxes, the 
figures include the IDH and royalties, which are not normally represented as taxes. Both 
figures kept pace with government expenditures until the 2014 price drop, but tax data was 
not available in the following years. As explained later in characteristic 4, Bolivia 
possessed sufficient savings to draw from after the price drop, but it is unclear how Bolivia 
will respond with a period of sustained low hydrocarbon prices.  
 
Figure 19. Bolivia’s Government Expenditure Compared to Direct and 
Indirect Taxes.205 
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Bilateral trade between Bolivia and China skyrocketed during Morales’s 
presidency, but the relationship soon began to favor the Chinese. Figure 20 graphs bilateral 
trade between Bolivia and China. The figure reveals that China increased its exports to 
Bolivia by a factor of 14 over 14 years. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s exports to China dipped 
during the commodity bust phase. Bolivia ships an insignificant level of natural gas to 
China because of the high costs of transport. Instead, most of Bolivia’s natural gas travels 
by pipeline to Brazil and Argentina.206 In 2017, Bolivia’s main exports to China were zinc, 
precious metal ore, lead, and copper.207 Meanwhile, China exported clothing, machinery, 
broadcasting equipment, buses, pesticides, and many other value-added products.208  
 
Figure 20. Bilateral Trade between Bolivia and China.209 
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Bolivia relied on China and other countries for value-added manufacturing during 
the Morales administration, considering manufacturing dropped from 11.3% of GDP in 
2006 to 10.3% in 2018. The World Bank acknowledged in 2015 that Bolivia’s growth was 
encouraging, but “uneven, with extractive industries, construction, and financial services 
showing rapid expansion, while agriculture and manufacturing fell behind.”210 Figure 21 
charts Bolivia’s overall trade balance during the Morales administration. The figure 
illustrates the why the World Bank was concerned about uneven growth. Bolivia’s overall 
trade balance dipped negative five years straight after the drop in commodity prices. The 
data indicates that while Bolivia’s GDP per capita increased, Bolivians increased their 
consumption of higher value goods, and many of those goods were imported from 
manufacturers like China instead of being produced in-country. 
 
Figure 21. Bolivia’s Overall Trade Deficit Suffered After a Drop in 
Hydrocarbon Prices in Late 2014.211  
 
210 “The Plurinational State of Bolivia Country Program Evaluation, FY05-13: An Independent 
Evaluation” (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2015), 1. 
211 Adapted from CEIC Data. Ceicdata.com.  
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In summary, Bolivia’s policies did not mitigate the resource curse in terms of its 
dependence on natural resources and the resulting negative trade balance. Instead, Bolivia 
experienced uneven growth as is expected from a resource-rich nation. Heavy extraction 
after nationalizing hydrocarbons played the biggest role in increasing dependence. 
However, Bolivia did not invest heavily in the future production of natural gas by 
neglecting exploration. Dependence on production prevented the advancement of value-
added processes, which in turn created negative trade balances. Nevertheless, the Bolivian 
government did not become dependent on foreign capital, and the government was 
prepared for the bust phase in the cycle because of cautious spending.     
4. Characteristic 4: High Government Spending 
States that suffer from the resource curse overspend because leaders do not have 
incentives to be frugal. In Chapter II, Ecuador’s heavy government expenditures became 
unsustainable, and the government depended on Chinese loans to maintain spending. When 
resource profits and Chinese loans diminished, the socioeconomic gains of Correa’s 
presidency appeared to be in danger of reversing. Due to reduced lending from China in 
Bolivia, it is expected that Bolivia will spend and save at a normal rate for countries 
experiencing the resource curse. If Chinese loans exacerbate the curse, limited lending 
normalizes the curse. Evidence shows that despite populist rhetoric, the Morales 
administration spent and saved resource rents at a conservative level. 
Despite booming profits from natural gas as previously discussed, the Bolivian 
government increased social spending judiciously. Morales famously added several social 
spending programs that boosted his popularity. Three programs in particular stood out: 
Juancito Pinto provided grants to incentivize families to keep children in school, the Juana 
Azurduy Voucher Program gave uninsured mothers funds to seek care during and after 
pregnancies, and Renta Dignidad provided funds for citizens over the age of 60.212 Even 
with increased social spending of 80% in real terms during Morales’s presidency, social 
spending matched the economic growth of the country.213 Before Morales came to power, 
 
212 Bunker et al., “Bolivia’s Economic Transformation,” 13. 
213 Bunker et al., 13. 
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Bolivia spent an average of 12.86% of GDP on social spending from 2001–2005.214 From 
2006 until the most recent data in 2017, social spending dropped to 11.9% of GDP, which 
was very near the Latin American average of 11.5 in 2017.215 However, in 2019 Bolivia 
still ranks last in the continent in per capita social spending at $310 per person, almost three 
times less than the regional average of $894 per person.216 Additionally, as shown 
previously in Figure 19, taxes matched overall government spending until 2014 when 
Bolivia utilized its abundance of foreign reserves. 
Not only did Bolivia spend more conservatively than widely believed, but the 
Morales administration saved funds for a rainy day. Instead of relying of foreign debt, 
Bolivia invested heavily in foreign reserves during the booms in natural gas prices. In fact, 
the IMF stated in 2010 that “even under fairly conservative parameter values, Bolivia 
would be at worst at the optimal [level of foreign reserves].”217 Figure 22 shows Bolivia´s 
foreign reserves as a percentage of total external debt. As Figure 22 indicates, Bolivia 
increased foreign reserves during Morales’s presidency and depended on those reserves to 
help balance the budget when profits fell in late 2014.  
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Figure 22. Bolivia’s Foreign Reserves as a % of Total External Debt Peaked 
During the Commodity Boom.218  
Overall, Bolivia was able to mitigate this characteristic of the resource curse with 
conservative spending and heavy savings. Although the Morales administration slashed 
poverty and inequality figures, they did not break the bank or rely on foreign capital to 
accomplish their goals. Instead, Bolivia relied on heavy extraction to take advantage of 
high commodity prices and saved foreign reserves at a conservative level to smooth future 
budgets. As a result, Bolivia´s socioeconomic gains during Morales´s presidency are 
sustainable for the near future. 
5. Characteristic 5: Misguided Public Works  
In Chapter I, misguided public works was identified as a characteristic of the 
resource curse because leaders have incentives to invest in projects that benefit them 
politically, but may not be economically sound. Evidence from Chapter II demonstrated 
that nontax revenue in the form of Chinese loans increased Ecuador’s ability to invest in 
white elephant projects that were not economically sound. With less lending from China—
and therefore less nontax revenue—it is expected that Bolivia did not have as many 
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opportunities to fund and execute white elephant projects. Overall, evidence shows that 
Bolivia’s central government experienced a high level of pushback from taxpayers for 
several energy mega-projects, in part due to the higher taxes discussed in characteristic 3.  
Throughout Morales’s presidency, Bolivia expressed interest in building several 
controversial hydroelectric plants. However, four mega-projects presented early in 
Morales’s presidency never broke ground. Two of the dams were destined to be a part of a 
hydroelectric power complex in the northeast border region with Brazil; however, the 
Brazilian-Bolivian binational Ribeirao dam and the Bolivian Cachuela Esperanza dam 
were never built. The estimated capacity of the Ribeirao dam was 3,000 megawatts (MW), 
and the Cachuela Esperanza projected 600 MW.219 The cost of the two dams was estimated 
at $2 billion and $1.2 billion, respectively.220 At the time of the initial projection in 2008, 
author Glenn Switkes warned that, if built, the dams could flood the surrounding areas near 
a city called Guayaramerín. In 2012, the two dams of the power complex on the Brazilian 
side were completed, and two years later, one of the worst floods in the history of the region 
occurred. Flooding and severe landslides affected 44,000 households in 113 municipalities 
in and surrounding Guayaramerín, with an estimated damage of $450 million.221 Both 
Brazil and Bolivia vowed to investigate the claim by scientists that “the dams contributed 
to the problem by holding back water until the rivers began to crest.”222 The Bolivian 
government received significant pushback from the local municipalities, and the two dams 
that were expected to be built on the Bolivian side never received funding. 
 
219 Glenn Switkes, “Muddy Waters: Consequences of Damming the Amazon’s Principal Tributary” 
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The Bala Project, another hydroelectric complex consisting of two dams, was also 
shelved after being put forward during the Morales administration.223 The government 
chose an Italian firm called Geodata Engineering to complete the pre-investment work in 
2016, a task estimated at $15 million for the $6 billion project.224 In the subsequent 
assessment, Geodata recommended that the project be delayed 20 years until more 
convenient conditions existed in Bolivia´s energy sector.225 The project was not cost- 
effective at the current energy prices. The government announced that they would be 
continuing with the project, but after resistance from citizens, talks of the plan 
evaporated.226  
Finally, another mega-dam named Rositas was proposed and financing was 
secured, but the project never broke ground due to the accountability that Morales’s 
administration faced. In 2016, Bolivia secured a $1 billion loan from the Chinese Ex-Im 
bank for the estimated $1.5 billion project, but the loan was never carried out.227 The local 
communities feared the environmental hazards the dam could produce, and opposing 
activists cited extreme costs. Pablo Solón, a specialist in climate change and an activist 
who played a part in delaying the mega-projects, claimed Rositas “would generate 
electricity at a cost of $74.33 per megawatt hour (MWh) when the average purchase price 
is $41 MWh.”228 Solón, who was also the Bolivian ambassador to the UN under Morales, 
additionally contended that Bolivia produces twice the amount of MW needed for domestic 
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supply and does not have any guaranteed export contracts that would necessitate excess 
hydroelectricity.229       
Outside of the energy sector, the Morales administration was not immune from 
criticism for other community projects. Two governmental projects in particular sparked a 
debate over the spending habits of the Morales administration: the South American 
Parliament building in San Benito, and a new presidential palace in La Paz. The South 
American Parliament building was constructed for UNASUR, a regional organization that 
begin to implode when several countries pulled out of the organization in 2018 and 2019. 
The building cost $60 million and was built in a city with a poverty rate of 45%.230 The 
palace was constructed for $34 million, but the government claimed the new building 
consolidated several agencies into one building and saved $20 million in rent per year.231 
Critics say that the money for both structures should have been used for hospitals; however, 
Morales’s history of medical infrastructure is strong. As of 2018, the administration had 
built 1,032 hospitals to bring Bolivia’s total to 3,902.232 Therefore, even when the Morales 
administration built controversial projects, the government had a strong public works 
record, and the costs of the projects in question were relatively low.  
In general, despite a few controversial project completions, the Bolivian public held 
the Morales administration accountable and prevented the government from starting 
construction on several projects that were considered high-cost and high-risk. The 
government even secured a loan from China for the Rositas mega-dam, but public pressure 
forced Morales to suspend operations before breaking ground. The Bolivian government 
relied on taxes and therefore invited accountability from the Bolivian people that prevented 
large-scale white elephant projects.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Bolivia mitigated several characteristics of the resource curse due to 
its conservative economic policies and lack of Chinese loans. The decentralization of 
Bolivia reduced corruption in the central government partially because there was less 
money in the national budget, and therefore fewer opportunities for centralized decision- 
making. Less funding also reduced Morales’s opportunities to buy off the population, 
obtain the loyalty of the military, or suppress political opponents. On the other hand, the 
Morales administration depended heavily on the extraction of natural gas at the expense of 
manufacturing, and consequently the economy experienced uneven growth. However, 
whether from internal pressure or Chinese uncertainty, Bolivia did not become dependent 
on Chinese lending to deepen natural resource dependency. Reduced lending and high 
savings paved the way for moderate spending from the Morales administration despite the 
populist and anti-neoliberal rhetoric. Finally, Bolivia experienced a relatively high degree 
of social accountability due to a reduced amount of nontax revenue. Perhaps Morales 
benefited from the timing of his rise to power. The natural gas industry was poised for a 
boom market, and the country possessed enormous reserves. However, the Morales 
administration capitalized on its fortunate timing and executed a sound financial plan that 
resulted in unprecedented socioeconomic gains. Bolivia must adjust its approach to 
continue growth, but for now, Bolivia has beaten the resource curse.              
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA’S PATHS DIVERGE 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and the rest of Latin American enjoyed what is known as the 
China Boom from 2003 until 2013.233 China experienced unprecedented domestic growth 
during the China Boom,  and partially due to China’s increasing demand for commodities, 
Latin American economies grew 3.6% per year.234 For Ecuador and Bolivia, two resource-
rich countries that depend on hydrocarbon sales,  the GDP gains were even higher. Both 
countries posted a GDP growth averaging 4.7% per year during the 11-year period.235 A 
few years into the China Boom, two populist presidents took over the Andean nations—
Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007, and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2006. Each president 
campaigned and won on a platform of resource nationalism and anti-neoliberalism, and 
each used the increase in resource rents to drastically improve poverty and equality 
numbers in their respective economies during the commodity boom. Starting in 2014, the 
China Boom tapered, and a bust cycle followed due to falling commodity prices. The prices 
for Ecuador and Bolivia’s main exports—petroleum and natural gas respectively—were 
cut in half. The two Andean countries had experienced the ups and downs of commodity 
markets before. Both nations previously struggled to take advantage of their resource 
wealth. Many others say this is due to the resource curse—a theory that describes the 
paradoxical struggle resource-rich nations face politically and economically. However, 
despite the similarities between the two countries and their respective leaders, the paths of 
Ecuador and Bolivia began to diverge in 2014, especially economically. Ecuador’s 
economy slowed and then stagnated, but Bolivia’s steady economic growth continued. In 
other words, Ecuador was again suffering from issues identified by the resource curse, 
while Bolivia appeared to have partially mitigated the same issues.        
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This thesis examined how the resource curse interacted with heavy Chinese lending 
to Ecuador and conservative economic policies in Bolivia. The thesis argues that after the 
hard-left turn in both nations, Chinese loans exacerbated the resource curse in Ecuador, 
while Bolivia partially mitigated the resource curse by decentralizing, saving foreign 
reserves, and resisting heavy lending from China. Despite similar reputations as far-left 
populist presidents of resource-rich countries, Rafael Correa and Evo Morales led their 
respective countries to distinct economic outcomes. Additionally, both countries 
experienced corruption and autocratization, but Ecuador’s troubles seemed to be 
aggravated and more connected to nontax revenue such as resource rents and Chinese 
loans. Overall, the key difference was the action that each government took during the 
economic boom to prepare for the bust: Ecuador became dependent on China and Chinese 
loans for growth, and Bolivia created self-sufficient growth. Ecuador’s socioeconomic 
growth became unsustainable, while Bolivia’s economic model proved to be mostly 
viable—and perhaps a blueprint for other resource-cursed countries.  
This chapter will be a summary of the central findings of the case studies of Ecuador 
and Bolivia. The first section will describe how Chinese loans exacerbate the resource 
curse. The next section will compare the situations and actions of the two countries 
according to the five characteristics of the resource curse, and theoretical takeaways will 
be discussed. Finally, the chapter will provide recommendations, and suggest areas for 
further research.  
B. CHINESE LOANS AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The resource curse generates political and economic challenges along five key 
dimensions: institutions, democracy, economic dependence, government spending, and 
public works. Resource-rich countries tend to have ineffective institutions because 
governments put forward a single decision-maker, or small team, to bargain with 
international companies over resource rents. Therefore, a large portion of the country’s 
income passes through only a few hands, making centralized decision-making more 
susceptible to corruption. Leaders of resource-rich countries are also more likely to 
demonstrate autocratic tendencies because they have additional nontax revenue to buy the 
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loyalty of their population and military while oppressing their political opponents. 
Additionally, resource-rich countries tend to suffer from the Dutch Disease. They pump 
investments into the resource industry while neglecting other industries, eventually 
creating trade deficits when the country’s exports turn into low value-added commodities 
and uncompetitive products. Furthermore, leaders of resource-rich countries do not have 
incentives to be frugal, and therefore they spend exorbitantly. These leaders want to take 
advantage of the resource rents before they are exhausted, and nontax revenue inherently 
provokes less accountability than tax revenue. Finally, they are more likely to pursue 
misguided public works that may benefit them politically, but are not economically viable. 
Countries that demonstrate these characteristics suffer from the resource curse.        
Broadly, this thesis has hypothesized that Chinese loans have similar traits to 
resource rents, and may therefore may exacerbate the resource curse in resource-rich 
nations. More specifically, the thesis has examined hypotheses pertaining to each of the 
characteristics. First, I hypothesized that Chinese loans are likely to further decrease the 
effectiveness of institutions in resource-cursed countries because decision-making is prone 
to become over-centralized when international companies need a bargaining partner. This, 
in turn, facilitates corruption. Chinese loans create the same effect as resource rents because 
China prefers to deal with a few key leaders from borrowing nations, and details of the 
loans are not widely released. The loans lack transparency, and corruption is more easily 
hidden.  
Second, this thesis hypothesizes that leaders of resource-rich countries pursuing 
Chinese loans are more likely to display authoritarian tendencies. So-called strongmen 
have access to nontax revenue that permits them to buy loyalty and longevity, while they 
oppress opponents with reduced accountability from citizens. Bilateral Chinese loans have 
less conditionality in comparison to traditional Western capital and multilateral banks, and 
the extra funds are not coming out of citizens’ pockets. Therefore, Chinese loans create 
less accountability for borrowing governments from above and below.  
Additionally, this thesis posits that Chinese loans create even more dependence on 
resource wealth and negative trade balances. China is particularly interested in primary 
commodities because it has an enormous population to supply and is the world leader in 
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manufacturing. Therefore, Chinese loans typically target energy or natural resource sectors 
in borrowing countries, and cheap Chinese high value-added imports further tip the scales 
to produce trade deficits for the borrower.  
The thesis also suggests that countries borrowing heavily from China exhibit further 
intensified spending. As previously discussed, less accountability is attached to nontax 
revenue, and natural resources are extinguishable. Chinese loans are also extinguishable. 
When China’s domestic growth slows, Chinese lending slows or disappears and can create 
an economic vacuum. Leaders of borrowing nations want to borrow from China while they 
can, and consequently enjoy reduced accountability.   
Finally, leaders have heightened incentives to build mega-projects. Leaders of 
resource-cursed countries have funds available to spend on projects that may be politically 
rather than economically motivated. China’s involvement supersizes white elephant 
projects because of the enormous injection of capital and construction expertise. Overall, 
it was expected that a country that borrowed heavily from China would suffer an 
exacerbated resource curse and become more dependent on China. 
C. COUNTRY COMPARISON 
This thesis argues that, despite their similarities at the beginning of the hard-left 
turn, Ecuador and Bolivia’s paths diverged both politically and economically. The main 
policy difference between the two countries is visualized in Figure 23. Figure 23 shows the 
dollar amount of foreign reserves in comparison to Chinese loans received in both 
countries. In green, Bolivia’s savings in the form of foreign reserves are far superior to 
Ecuador’s foreign reserves. Ecuador—represented in blue—relied on external debt, and 
especially on Chinese loans.  
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Figure 23. Foreign Reserves and Chinese Loans in Ecuador and Bolivia.236 
The different methods of Ecuador and Bolivia produced diverging economic 
results. Figure 24 displays the GDP per capita annual % growth. Figure 25 illustrates the 
GINI index. The figures indicate that Ecuador and Bolivia diverged in terms of wealth and 
equality after the commodity bust in late 2014. Ecuador’s GDP per capita growth began to 
reverse, while Bolivia’s growth steadily continued. Likewise, economic equality stagnated 
in Ecuador, but continues to improve in Bolivia where the government is cashing in foreign 
reserves to maintain growth.       
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Figure 24. GDP Per Capita Growth (Annual %), Bolivia and Ecuador237 
 
Figure 25. GINI Index, World Bank Estimate for Bolivia and Ecuador238 
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In the remainder of this section, I will compare the two countries along each of the 
dimensions of the resource curse explored in this thesis. The different characteristics of the 
resource curse help expound the argument to determine how the different policy measures 
executed in Ecuador and Bolivia affected the countries politically and economically. As a 
whole, the characteristics demonstrate that Chinese loans exacerbated the resource curse 
in Ecuador, while foreign reserves and other conservative economic policies partially 
mitigated the resource curse in Bolivia.  
1. Characteristic 1: Ineffective Institutions 
In Chapter II, Ecuador centralized its decision-making under the administration of 
Correa to become a bargaining partner with the IOCs during the nationalization process. 
Later, the trend continued as the Chinese loans were negotiated by a select team headed by 
Correa and a few government officials. Several of these leaders—including Correa and one 
of his vice presidents—demonstrated institutionalized corruption and were eventually 
charged with corruption and sentenced to prison. As described above, Chinese loans lacked 
transparency, and this characteristic seemed to abet the Correa administration in 
institutionalized corruption.  
China’s reluctance initially to invest in Bolivia was due to Bolivia’s 
decentralization—a trait that developed both before and after Morales came to power. 
There were a few signs of corruption involving resource rents, but nothing on the scale of 
Ecuador’s troubles with Operation Car Wash or the Arroz Verde case. Morales was able to 
keep his distance from the few resource-related incidents that did occur during his time in 
office, and overall, corruption decreased during Morales’s presidency.  
Figure 26 shows the regime corruption as measured by the V-Dem Institute in both 
Ecuador and Bolivia starting at the beginning of each leader’s presidency. As seen in the 
figure, corruption rose in Ecuador during the oil boom, and the sharp drop occurred when 
Correa left office and Chinese loans tapered in 2017. The V-Dem Institute’s assessment 
seems to confirm that the Correa administration was characterized by institutionalized 
corruption while handling increased nontax revenue. An analysis of Bolivia’s corruption 
levels suggests that rather than experiencing increased corruption during the Morales 
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administration and commodity boom-and-bust cycles, Bolivia actually experienced a 
decline in corruption. Based on evidence from Chapters II and III, Ecuador’s extra funding 
from China in the hands of executive members could be a key factor in the divergence. 
 
Figure 26. Regime Corruption from V-Dem Institute.239 
2. Characteristic 2: Authoritarian Tendencies 
Ecuador’s experience using Chinese loans demonstrates how leaders can use the 
extra funding to enhance their authoritarian tendencies. Correa was able to use resource 
rents and Chinese loans to oppress political opponents through surveillance and by 
burdening his successors with heavy debt. China built and financed the ECU 911 system, 
a police surveillance system that was allegedly used to keep track of political opponents. 
Additionally, current Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno has few financial options 
because he inherited more than $8 billion of Chinese debt and a commitment to ship 90 % 
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of all crude oil to China through 2024. Consequently, opaque Chinese loans may have 
uniquely assisted autocratization under the Correa administration.  
In Bolivia’s case study, Morales did demonstrate authoritarian tendencies, but they 
were not amplified by Chinese loans. Morales expressed his authoritarian tendencies by 
stacking allies and power in the central government, but evidence suggests that Morales 
was not able to use nontax revenue to buy off the public, obtain military loyalty, or oppress 
political opponents.  
Figure 27 maps the autocratization in both countries according to the V-Dem 
Institute. Ecuador’s autocratization is more sudden and dramatic, while Bolivia’s descent 
appears to be a gradual erosion. Bolivia´s slow autocratization appears to mirror the 
argument of authors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, who claim that democracies no 
longer die suddenly with a coup, but instead suffer gradually from weakening 
institutions.240 However, Ecuador’s autocratization was arguably precipitated using funds 
from the nationalization of hydrocarbons, and then further exacerbated by Chinese lending 
starting in 2010. Based on evidence from Chapter II, Correa used these funds to quickly 
increase social spending to gain public support and later oppress political opponents. On 
the other hand, Morales was more conservative with resource rents from the beginning, 
doubling foreign reserves in his first year in office. Therefore, it seems that Chinese loans 
may have sped up and sustained Correa’s democratic erosion, while Bolivia’s 
autocratization under Morales followed the expected path of a democratically elected 
leader slowly chipping away at democracy. 
 




Figure 27. The Liberal Democracy Index from the V-Dem Institute.241 
3. Characteristic 3: Dependence on Resource Wealth and Negative Trade 
Balance 
Evidence from Chapter II suggests that Ecuador used Chinese loans to become even 
more dependent on its resource wealth. After nationalizing, the Correa administration 
ramped up hydrocarbon extraction, while at the same time manufacturing stagnated—a 
process called primarization. The large injection of capital in the form of Chinese loans 
was mostly directed towards the energy sector because China requires an immense supply 
of energy and also has expertise and excess capacity in construction. These factors 
amplified Ecuador’s dependence on the energy sector. Meanwhile, imports from China 
increased as Ecuador purchased more value-added consumer goods. Due to these factors, 
Ecuador’s trade balance suffered. Overall, Ecuador became increasingly dependent on 
petroleum and Chinese loans to maintain socioeconomic growth.    
Bolivia also struggled to diversify its economy, but the government did not 
exacerbate its dependence in the same manner as Ecuador. Nationalization induced Bolivia 
to heavily extract natural gas, but the government did not have additional funds to reinvest 
in the hydrocarbon industry. Therefore, Bolivia did not substantially invest in the 
 
241 Source: Jan Teorell, “Liberal Democracy Index” (Gothenburg, Sweden: Varieties of Democracy 












exploration of natural gas while its reserves dwindled. Bolivia’s trade balance fell to a 
deficit as natural gas reserves fell, and commodity prices dropped. Overall, this 
characteristic of the resource curse was the hardest for Bolivia to overcome.     
In comparison, both countries ramped up hydrocarbon extraction and production as 
manufacturing stagnated. Both Andean nations also relied on foreign manufacturers like 
China to supply their emerging consumer markets. However, Ecuador’s tax revenue did 
not keep up with spending, and the government filled the gaps with Chinese loans. Bolivia 
did not use much external lending, but as a result, exploration may have been underfunded.  
4. Characteristic 4: High Government Spending 
The availability of Chinese loans reduced Ecuador’s incentives to save during the 
Correa administration. Ecuador’s social spending was below Latin American averages 
when Correa took office, and he increased spending perhaps too quickly without any 
safeguards in the form of foreign reserves. The reported high savings that Ecuador 
accumulated were in reality used to build much-needed infrastructure, but overall Ecuador 
overspent and did not save enough for falling oil prices. 
Bolivia increased foreign reserves and spent more shrewdly than Ecuador during 
the Morales administration. Despite his populist reputation, Morales did not heavily 
increase spending, but instead saved at a conservative rate. In fact, his administration’s 
foreign reserves were considered optimal by the IMF. Moreover, Bolivia did not use 
Chinese loans to balance the budget. In general, Morales’s economic plan freed Bolivia 
from this particular resource curse characteristic.  
On the economic side, spending versus savings was the main difference between 
the two countries. Both countries experienced socioeconomic growth during the populist 
regimes of Correa and Morales, but only Bolivia has maintained that growth. Both 
economies were built to take advantage of the commodity boom, but only Bolivia’s 
economy was constructed to withstand the bust by saving resource rents during the 
commodity boom to prepare for the bust. Figure 24 displays total reserves as a % of total 
external debt for both countries. The figure demonstrates that Bolivia dipped into its 
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foreign reserves while hydrocarbon prices dropped, but Ecuador never built in a safeguard 
for the bust because it relied on Chinese lending. 
 
Figure 28. Total Reserves as a % of Total External Debt.242 
5. Characteristic 5: Misguided Public Works  
Chinese loans exacerbated white elephant projects in Ecuador because they 
garnered less accountability, added surplus funds to invest, and required Chinese 
construction. Evidence from Chapter II suggests that Chinese loans prompted less 
accountability from Ecuadorian taxpayers, and therefore more freedom for the Correa 
administration to spend on political projects. As previously discussed, Ecuador needed to 
invest in infrastructure. However, Ecuador’s public works became misguided mega-
projects when Chinese capital was introduced. A large portion of the loans included 
conditions to use Chinese construction, which meant higher levels of expertise and 
technology, but Ecuadorians did not receive a technology transfer. Additionally, many of 
the projects—including the Coca Codo Sinclair dam—encountered major issues.  
 







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Total Reserves
(% of Total External Debt)
Ecuador Bolivia
83 
The Morales administration had plans to build several mega-hydroelectric projects 
in Bolivia, but the plans were thwarted because of pushback from the Bolivian population. 
The controversial projects that Morales did build were relatively small, and his 
administration’s strong record in building hospitals suggests that Bolivia’s public works 
were mostly successful.  
When comparing the two countries, the evidence demonstrates that Bolivia would 
have built similar mega-projects if it had secured Chinese lending and gained the 
acceptance of the population. Early on during Morales’s presidency, China was reluctant 
to loan to Bolivia. However, even when Morales secured a loan for a mega-project towards 
the end of his presidency, he received pushback from the population. For these reasons, 
Chinese loans appeared to be the key factor responsible for the augmented projects in 
Ecuador.   
D. THEORETICAL TAKEAWAYS AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
In line with the central findings from the case studies, several theoretical takeaways 
emerge and can possibly be applied to other developing resource-rich countries in Latin 
America and the rest of the world.  
First, Chinese loans, while seemingly granting countries significant independence 
in the use of the funds in the short-term, nonetheless seem to exacerbate poor policy choices 
on the part of borrowing governments. Chinese loans are considered a form of patient 
capital because they do not place many conditions on borrowers. This could give 
responsible governments the economic freedom they need to accelerate growth, but the 
lack of oversight may instead stunt long-term economic growth in exchange for short-term 
political gains, as it did in Ecuador.  
Second, although political leaders need not automatically fall into corruption and 
authoritarianism by merely accepting the loans, the particular structure and the opaqueness 
of these loans do seem to incentivize particular institutional and economic dynamics, 
similar to the fashion in which natural resource wealth operates. While not inescapable, 
these pitfalls become more probable.  
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Third, enacting policies that ensure economic sustainability and independence, on 
the other hand, seems to be a much more effective solution. While allowing the country to 
weather the storm of a bust, it also seems to generate incentives to increase institutional 
effectiveness. When a country becomes less dependent on external debt, it is not 
economically exposed to problems such as capital flight or a reduction in Chinese lending. 
Bolivia’s choice to save foreign reserves made it less dependent on China and other foreign 
lenders such as the United States, the IMF, or private capital. 
Finally, Chinese loans may not have the conditionality of traditional lending from 
the west, but the loans do have conditions and are not altruistic. China secures future 
resources with loan-for-oil deals. Additionally, the loans help build new supply chains that 
funnel primary resources to China’s large population and put excess labor to work 
overseas. 
Altogether, the findings of this research point to a significant association between 
Chinese lending and the resource curse in Latin American economies. This conclusion is 
supported by analysis of the key dimensions of the resource curse. However, other factors 
that this thesis is unable to account for may have also heightened this association. In 
particular, while Correa and Morales represented similar cases of far-left politics, there 
may nonetheless be key differences between the two leaders that contributed to 
exacerbating the resource curse in Ecuador and ameliorating it in Bolivia. Such differences 
may stem either from their leadership qualities or from their ties to civil society, both or 
either of which may have constrained Morales’s behavior in distinct ways. Additionally, 
Correa may have had his hands tied politically and economically. Ecuador’s social 
spending and infrastructure quality was below average in Latin America before his time in 
office. After defaulting on Western loans, Correa may not have had many creditors 
available to solve Ecuador’s deficiencies.     
E. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study’s findings suggest that, for resource-rich countries, establishing savings 
mechanisms during periods of boom may better enable Latin American economies to 
weather moments of economic crisis. When resource-rich countries reduce foreign 
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influence and avoid unsustainable debt, they can more easily sustain growth and avoid the 
pitfalls of the resource curse. Savings mechanisms that are recommended by the IMF such 
as foreign reserves and sovereign wealth funds can smooth budget deficits during 
commodity bust cycles. These funds also encourage sustainable social spending that 
reduces poverty and inequality, and decreases the likelihood of tough austerity measures. 
Additionally, resource-rich countries must find the right balance between nationalization 
and privatization that works for their specific situation. Nationalized companies can be 
more profitable, but countries must have effective institutions to oversee operations, 
prevent corruption, and encourage environmentally friendly exploration.  
This thesis also acknowledges that the United States and other lenders must provide 
an alternative to Chinese lending that fosters economic independence, diversification, and 
industrialization. In 2018, the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development 
Act—or BUILD Act—was passed in order to fund the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC). The USIDFC is a partial response to 
China’s bilateral loans; however, instead of prioritizing state-led development, it “offers a 
private sector, market-based solution” to developing countries.243 Nonetheless, the $60 
billion funding for USIDFC cannot compete with China on its own. To curtail increasing 
Chinese economic influence, the United States can consider reinforcing the United States 
Export-Import Bank and increasing leadership in multilateral development banks.244 In 
addition, the United States and other lenders may also consider moving away from the 
requirement of  harsh austerity measures that could backfire in resource-rich countries, and 
may push away governments aiming to implement redistributive policies. Overall, instead 
of asking leaders from developing countries to choose between the United States and 
China, United States policymakers must find solutions that are attractive to both the private 
sector and the state capitalist model.   
 
243 Daniel F. Runde and Romina Bandura, “The BUILD Act Has Passed: What’s Next?,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, accessed June 1, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/build-act-has-
passed-whats-next. 
244 Runde and Bandura. 
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Finally, the continuation of Chinese lending in contexts such as China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative provides many opportunities for further research into issues discussed in 
this thesis. The motivations of countries who accept loans are not fully examined in this 
thesis, and neither is the competitiveness of other lending options. Further research could 
also be focused on specific natural resources other than hydrocarbons, and how they relate 
to the resource curse and Chinese loans. In the end, Chinese loans by themselves are mostly 
innocuous; but combined with poor policies of borrowers and traps like the resource curse, 
Chinese loans have the potential to derail once promising economies.        
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